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INTRODUCTION

How might improvements in artificial intelligence (Al) technology affect
trademark law? This Article approaches the question by imagining trademark law in
a world in which we can fully outsource our consuming decisions to Als that know
our preferences better than we do. Leaving aside whether the technology is possible,
this thought experiment tells us something about today's trademark doctrine and its
response to changes in online technology and culture.
Part I imagines a hypothetical Al capable of assuming responsibility for our lives
as consumers. Part H argues that a sufficiently sophisticated technology would render
trademarks superfluous in many cases. Trademarks function by simplifying
information. We use them to stand in for a broad range of (sometimes contradictory)
data assembled from a variety of sources. Because human cognition is limited, the
ability of trademarks to serve as a shortcut is valuable, but it is a second-best solution.
With unlimited time or enhanced capacities, we would be better able to find optimal
products without relying on the simple information signals offered by trademarks.
As it is, sifting through all the available data is not a wise use of our limited attention.
But the hypothetical Al is not similarly limited, and a sufficiently advanced Al
"shopper" would exist to analyze the context that trademarks allow us to ignore. The
role of trademarks in such a world is more limited-and consequently requires less
protection-than what we see today.
Part I explains that the hypothetical Al also illuminates a tension between
trademark law and the consumption of knowledge online. Before the internet, the
relative scarcity of "space" for information--be it on library shelves, newspaper
pages, or television channels-conferred authority on those-be they librarians,
editors, or programmers-able to curate it. Not so online. Comparatively speaking,
there is room enough for practically anything. We therefore rely on filtration, rather
than curation, to find information; our filters leave the rejected data available for
others to find and use as they see fit! This facilitates the formation of communities
that have mutually irreconcilable conceptions of truth. These disagreements could
extend to trademark meaning, but the current model of trademark information
reflects, to a large extent, the scarcity model that has proven ill-adapted to life online.
Of course, the hypothetical Al does not, and may never, exist. As Part IV
explains, however, we can see its forerunners in web platforms like Amazon and
Facebook. They are already changing trademark doctrine, and they illustrate why
trademarks may be less important in the future. And of course, these technologies
raise any number of troubling questions, but they are not the sort that trademark law
is designed to address.

2 DAVID WEINBERGER, Too BIG TO KNOW 11 (2011).
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I. Al

SHOPPERS

A. Machine learning
Computers now surpass humans at any number of skills associated with
cognition. Chess and checkers fell a long time ago,3 and computers now reign
supreme at Go, a game once thought to be too complex for A. n Even poker, with the
human element of bluff seemingly built into the rules of the game, is not immune.'
And a variety of tasks once thought to be the exclusive domain of trained
professionals are ever increasingly open to automation.6
Many recent advances are popularly associated with machine learning. Rather
than program a computer with predetermined algorithms that channel the machine's
processing power, this approach leaves it to computers to sort out methods for
themselves.7 Computers can find patterns in the data they receive (or generate) and
then apply derived rules to the assigned task, refining them iteratively.8 As a result,
a computer may teach itself to, say, defeat a human at the game of Go, but its internal
rules for selecting a good move may diverge from those used by human
professionals.9 The results work, but the steps followed by the machine are opaque
3
Alexis
C.
Madrigal,
How
Checers
Was
Solvd,
ALANTIC
(July
19,
2017):
httpsJAwww.heaantic.conmvhnology/arhive/2017/07/maion-mnsey-eckers/5341 11/ [htps:/enmacc/4FMARU27]; see Olivia Solon, Oh the Huanuity!Poker ComputerTrounces Humans in Big StepforAI,GUARDIAN (Jan. 30,
2017,
17-00 EST), https:/Avww.diegud ancom/technology/27fjan/30/hbras-poker-afcia-inteligencepivfessional-human-players-competition [https.//pena.cc/ADD7-PHAV].
" See Christopher Moyer, How Google's AlphaGo Beat a Go World Champion, ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/03/the-invisible(Mar.
28,
2016),
opponent/47561 1/ [https://perma.cc/7XHR-KQKT].
' Solon, supra note 3. Similarly, an Al system prevailed against top players in the war strategy game
StarCraft. Kelsey Piper, StarCraft is a Deep, Complicated War Strategy Game. Google's AlphaStar Al
CrushedIt., VOx (Jan. 24, 2019, 7:04 PM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/1/24/18196177/aiartificial-intelligence-google-deepmind-starcraf-game [https://perma.cc/W4US-SA82].
6 See, e.g., Steve Lohr, A.L is Doing Legal Work. But It Won't Replace Lawyers, Yet., N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
19,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/technology/lawyers-artificial-intelligence.html
[https://perma.cc/C34X-ANSQ]; Jessica Stillman, An A.I Just Outperformed 20 Top Lawyers (and the
Lawyers Were Happy), INC. (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.inc.com/jessica-stillman/an-ai-just-outperformed20-top-lawyers-and-lawyers-were-happy.html [https://perma.cc/GR9H-MJAC].
7 See David Silver et al., A GeneralReinforcement LearningAlgorithm that Masters Chess, Shogi,
at
1140,
1140,
and
Go
through
Self-play,
SCI.,
Dec.
7,
2018,
[https://perma.cc/M6NS-EU9A]
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/362/6419/1140.full.pdf
("Our results demonstrate that a general-purpose reinforcement learning algorithm can learn, tabula
rasa-without domain-specific human knowledge or data, as evidenced by the same algorithm succeeding
in multiple domains-superhuman performance across multiple challenging games.").
' See id. ("A long-standing ambition of artificial intelligence has been to create programs that can
instead learn for themselves from first principles. Recently, the AlphaGo Zero algorithm achieved
superhuman performance in the game of Go, by representing Go knowledge using deep convolutional
neural networks, trained solely by reinforcement learning from games of self-play." (footnotes omitted)).
As when AlphaGo defeated the human champion Lee Sedol in the game of Go:

With the 37th move in the match's second game, AlphaGo landed a surprise on the
right-hand side of the 19-by-19 board that flummoxed even the world's best Go players,
including Lee Sedol. "That's a very strange move," said one commentator, himself a nine dan
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to humans.' 0 Indeed, in some cases computers need only the rules of the game, and
they can take it from there. 1
Though the precise line between hype and actual potential is unclear, machine
learning technology can be put to any number of uses. Google famously used it to
change its translation software, discarding years of effort that focused on algorithmic
translation rules and dictionary databases. 2 The company found better results when
it fed a program an extensive library of works and translations, letting the program
discern translation rules of its own."
It seems reasonable to assume that today's high-end Al technology will continue
to develop and eventually find its way into consumer products, deployable to a range
of ends. Suppose we use it to manage our purchasing decisions?
B. The digitalshopper
Various forms of Al already mediate our lives as consumers,' 4 but thinking about
potential future developments may provide interesting insights into trademark law.
Imagine-no claims are made that this thought experiment is necessarily plausible
in all its details-an Al far surpassing today's rudimentary digital assistance tools.
This hypothetical digital shopper could fully manage your purchasing choices, as the
Al can be delegated the task of researching, evaluating, and purchasing goods and
services on your behalf. Your digital personal shopper will be trained in your
preferences and possessions, supplemented as necessary by further input, and it will
then extrapolate the nature of goods and services that are likely to please. It may err
from time to time-just as you do-but soon enough it will know you well enough
to outperform you in predicting what you'll like. The advantage will not simply be
one of time saved-in which the Al delivers a second-best choice that satisfies
because you could skip the effort of shopping-the machine will be better at figuring

Go player, the highest rank there is. "I thought it was a mistake," said the other. Lee Sedol,
after leaving the match room, took nearly fifteen minutes to formulate a response....
Indeed, the move turned the course of the game. AlphaGo went on to win Game Two, and at
the post-game press conference, Lee Sedol was in shock. "Yesterday, I was surprised," he said
through an interpreter, referring to his loss in Game One. "But today I am speechless. If you
look at the way the game was played, I admit, it was a very clear loss on my part. From the
very beginning of the game, there was not a moment in time when I felt that I was leading."
It was a heartbreaking moment. But at the same time, those of us who watched the match inside
Seoul's Four Seasons hotel could feel the beauty of that one move ....

Cade Metz, In Two Moves, AlphaGo and Lee Sedol Redefined the Future,WIRED (Mar. 16, 2016, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wiredcom/2016/03/two-moves-alphago-lee-sedol-redefined-fiumre [https'//permiacc/2QE9-K7J8].
'0 See Will Knight The Dark Secret at the Heart of Al, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 11, 2017),
https/Avww.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ [httpsJ/pemtacc/X8NH-6NGQ].
" See, e.g., Silver et al., supra note 7, at 1140.
12 See Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.L Awakening, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html
[https://perma.cc/79R8-VVHP].
"3See id.
14See infra Part IV.
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out what you'll like. The AI's ability to sift through the flood of available data in
tireless search of optimal results will further enhance its advantage.
Even though the Al knows your desires better than you do, you will not
understand why. Maybe the suggestion to eat at the new creperie owes its origin to a
political donation, a song on your playlist, your hometown, or some combination of
these or other details. Who knows why? The Al sees a pattern, and it works.15
Imagine further that this experience is so typical as to be banal. Everyone takes
for granted that their consumer avatars are as much a part of the fabric of life as
smartphones are today. They take care of business and are given thought only on the
rare occasion that something goes wrong, and the Al needs the gentle guidance of a
thumbs down button (or its future equivalent).
C. Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play?
There are any number of possible objections to the framing of the hypothetical.
Some concern the various reasons that it may be unrealistic. For example, the
hypothesized Al relies on an ability to understand language that contemporary Al
lack and may never achieve. The response is simply that this is a thought 16
experiment,
not a prediction. As we say to our students, don't fight the hypothetical.
More importantly, the above account of a personal assistant Al will likely strike
many as dystopic, perhaps because of the privacy implications for the user or for
society at large-insofar as the technology might require considerable personal and
third-party data to make effective predictions on behalf of its user.' That data must
be collected and assembled, creating a privacy security risk. Worse, getting
individuals to generate and reveal the data necessary to feed the machine may require
an unacceptable level of individual manipulation. That is, devices may be engineered
to prod people into providing the data that may then be the basis of Al learning on a
scale beyond what already generates alarm today. 8 This is independent of other
is As when Netflix recommends things I have already seen because I recently watched something
else, but with greater accuracy and utility.
" Though to this particular objection, perhaps full linguistic comprehension is unnecessary. If IBM

Watson can understand Jeopardy questions well enough to answer them, it is not clear that
non-comprehending,
but advanced, Al would be incapable of shopping for goods.
17
Even then, that data may be too retrospective to provide useful predictions for novel situations. See CATHY

O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DEsTRUcION: How BIG DATA INCREASES INFQUAITrY AND THREATENS
DEMOCRACY 204 (2016) ('Big Data processes codify the past. They do not invent the future.").
18 See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 284-85 (2019) ("The new toolmakers do not intend to rob you
of your inner life, only to surveil and exploit it. All they ask is to know more about you than you know
about yourself."); id. at 241 ("All that is moist and alive must hand over its facts. There can be no shadow,
no darkness. The unknown is intolerable."). Zuboff sees the development of digital assistants as part of
this process. See id. at 255-60. The dynamic she describes applies, however, to a wide range of
technology. In her account, the drive is to render an ever-greater amount of data as fodder for the
prediction markets that depend on it. See, e.g., id. at 236-38 (describing data collected by Nest thermostat
and mattress companies and the practical difficulty of preventing its collection). Furthermore, using
devices engineered to encourage use creates potential psychological harm independent of the underlying
goal. See generally ADAM ALTER, IRRESISTIBLE: THE RISE OF ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 108

that the AI might nudge consumers
manipulation possibilities, such as the prospect
9
into particular purchases or other decisions.'
As important as these considerations are, they are largely outside the scope of
this Article,20 which is interested in the hypothetical Al as a tool for examining
trademark law. It does not advocate for its development, nor does it take a position
on how or whether consumer Al technology should develop more generally. My
bracketing off certain policy questions is not to deny the prospect that the costs of an
Al shopper might outweigh the benefits.
D. AIs and trademarks
Thinking about the implications for trademark law requires that we refme the
hypothetical further. First, assume that an AI will encounter trademarks in ways
analogous to life online today. Today, one encounters marks in content, including
advertising, seller web pages, product reviews by professionals (e.g., a New York
Times restaurant review) and fellow consumers (e.g., Yelp or Amazon.com reviews),
blog and social media references, appearances in videos, etc. Trademarks also appear
in information locators (e.g., URLs) and metadata. In the future, trademarks
presumably will continue to be used for a variety of purposes, and some of these uses
may be deceptive or confusing perhaps by intention, perhaps not. And as today, the
trademarks will be surrounded by context that may limit or exacerbate the potential
for confusion.
But Al shoppers will have the capability and patience to gather and process far
more distinguishing context than humans. A trademark may just be one input among
many considered by the Al, and these additional inputs will enable the Al to
understand more easily than a human the meaning of a mark in a given context and
its relevance, if any, to the Al's goal. This purpose is not to distinguish trademarks,
but rather to satisfy the preferences of the human the Al serves (unless one of these
preferences is for authentic trademarks). 2
The next question then concerns the Al's capabilities. Can it be confused or
gamed? We can imagine a range of possibilities here including, at the far end, the
BUSINESS OF KEEPING Us HOOKED (2017) (exploring the rise of behavioral addiction by users of digital
technology); id.
at 93-233 (describing "ingredients" of behavioral addiction and how they appear in digital
technologies).
19 See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 995, 999 (2014)
("[T]he digitization of commerce dramatically alters the capacity of firms to influence consumers at a
personal level."). This is tied to the question of whom the machine serves, for the right kind of assistant
might help us resist external manipulation. See infra note 177-178 and accompanying text.
20 A growing body of scholarship addresses these and other implications of Al involvement in
consumer decisions. See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REv. 815, 815
(2019) ("Advancing consumer welfare in the automated era requires not just consumer protection, but
digital intermediary protection); id. at 817-18 (collecting examples of scholarship on digital
intermediaries); Calo, supra note 19. I return to some of these issues below, but with a focus on their
interplay with trademark law. Though I do return to them below. See infra Parts IV-V.
21 As noted above, for now, I am avoiding the question of what the "true" preferences-if such
exist-are of any given consumer. See supra note 19. I take consumer preferences to be constructed out
of a mix of endogenous and exogenous inputs, and I assume they will continue to be so in the future. I am
not speculating how a world of ubiquitous, advanced Al might change the mix. I return to the issue below.
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prospect of an "omniscient" AI that cannot be misdirected by a false use of a
trademark- But even short of that, we might picture lesser Ads with superhuman
resistance to deception. An Al that outperforms humans generally may still deliver
the occasional "wrong" result due to external manipulation, but its capacity to learn
should make these errors unlikely to recur.2"
As this is a thought experiment, we can imagine any level of Al proficiency. We
begin at one end of the spectrum. What are the implications of Ads so powerful that
confusion as currently contemplated by trademark law becomes, for all practical
purposes, impossible? And how does this speculated endpoint of technological
development relate to issues in contemporary trademark law? Parts II and Im suggest
ways23that the hypothetical Ad may challenge fundamental premises of trademark
law. As it is, current technology reflects these challenges in an early form.In other
words, as explored in Part IV, many underlying assumptions of trademark law are
already undermined by improving digital technology.24

U.

THE "END" OF TRADEMARK LAW?

A sufficiently powerful Ad could upend trademark law by radically reducing the
relevance of trademarks. Today, trademarks simplify information by removing
context. But the hypothesized Ad's advantage lies in its ability to sort through
context. This capability reduces the importance of maintaining stable trademark
meanings, which exist in large part to allow cognitively limited humans to simplify
decisions by ignoringthe context in which trademarks appear. But if our tools were
able to put that context to use, trademarks would be left with less to do.
A. The role of trademarks
To see why, consider how trademarks function. They are defined by their ability
to help consumers identify and distinguish goods and services in the marketplace.25
Once in place, a valid mark conveys information via simplification, letting
consumers make assumptions without asking deeper questions about marketplace
context. So a buyer may ask for a COKE without wondering how the particular seller
defines the term. COKE-vagaries of corporate ownership and licensing
aside-designates a "single" source. Likewise, consumers may assume the relevance
of their past experience with a mark.26 For instance, eating at a MCDONALD's in
Connecticut provides relevant data about one in Oregon.
22 To be sure, consumer-serving As may end up in an arms race with parallel technologies designed

to deceive, resulting in an equilibrium that still allows for deception in the marketplace.
23 See infra Parts 11111.
24See infra Part IV.

2515 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).
26 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) ("In principle, trademark
law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, 'reduce[s] the customer's costs of
shopping and making purchasing decisions,' for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this
item-the item with this mark-is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or
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Trademarks also allow sellers to assume the expense of assembling product
information. For example, those in the tablet market need not hunt around to learn
about the product attributes of Apple's tablet. Apple is happy to gather the
information and attach it to the recognizable iPAD mark, enabling potential
purchasers to find the information that interests them (e.g., how much memory does
the iPAD AIR have?). And once the mark is at work, others may chime in with
additional information in the form of product reviews and the like. In time, a mark
may accumulate meanings having little to do with product attributes. Brands may,
for example, evoke a personality independently of any underlying good or service
(e.g., the tendency of fans to see themselves as part of a larger community, Red Sox
nonetheless, on the mark's ability to
Nation, for example). The process depends,
27
communicate a simple signal of source.
This potential scope of information is both a cost and a benefit to consumers.
Trademarks simplify a broad range of meanings; RED SOX, for example, evokes a
team, a fandom, and a regional identity. Wearing a branded cap with the team logo
may therefore communicate, "the American League baseball team that is based in
Boston and plays in Fenway Park," just as it represents "the team for which Ted
Williams and Pedro Martinez played" and "the traditional dominant regional sports
team of New England." Depending on who wears it and the context, the logo on a
cap might also communicate "I'm a Red Sox fan," "I'm from Boston," or
even-depending on where I am--I'm a liberal."
In all these cases, the mark reduces context to simple signals, each of which may
have considerably more nuance if spelled out. This can create issues if a mark is not
an "empty vessel" but rather brings meaning to the table. 28 For example, LOVEE
LAMB could not be registered for seat covers because the term suggests a product
made from animal skin when in fact it is not.29 Though the seller accurately described
the product in advertising, consumers are allowed to rely on the messages carried by
30
the mark, without being expected to hunt for corrective information.
This simplification also occurs even when a mark is performing a purely
source-identifying function. APPLE represents the source of many different kinds of
computers in a variety of markets, but the single mark spans them all.
One could spell the meanings out more precisely. The mark is not strictly
necessary, but it is helpful. We could imagine a world without enforceable trademark
rights in which one sees a soda branded COCA-COLA and then must do the work to
learn what precisely is meant by the term. Is it the well-known soft drink or
something else? Likewise, those in the market for a tablet computer could gather
product information themselves. But time and cognitive capacities are limited.

she liked (or disliked) in the past." (citation omitted) (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 2-3 (3d ed. 1994)); see also William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner,
27 Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987).
Michael Grynberg, Thick Marks, Thin Marks, 67 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 13, 20-22 (2016).
2
1 See generallyMichael Grynberg, A Trademark Defense of the DisparagementBar, 126 YALE L.J.
F. 178, 183-87 (2016).
29 See generally In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
3
0 See id. at 775.
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Trademark law therefore promotes useful transactions by limiting our need to sort
through context for routine purchasing decisions.31
But this is necessarily a second-best solution. Using the trademark shortcut
comes at the expense of delving more deeply into available information. Our
limitations of time and cognition make this eminently rational.32 It nonetheless
produces less optimal results than would be available in a world without these
limitations; by economizing information we necessarily miss things.
This is a well-known problem in trademark law, reflected by the selling power
possessed by many marks. Once a brand is the market leader (or sufficiently
advertised and thrust before us), it can take advantage of consumer inertia
(fed by cognitive shortcuts like the availability heuristic), making it harder for new
entrants to acquire market share.3 3 This may be so even when a newcomer offers a
superior price/quality balance to the incumbent market leader.34 Likewise, the owner
of an established mark may seek to leverage its goodwill in one market to enter
3 Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523,526-27 (1988)
("The economic role of the trademark is to help the consumer identify the unobservable features of the
trademarked product. This information is not provided to the consumer in an analytic form, such as an
indication of size or a listing of ingredients, but rather in summary form, through a symbol which the
consumer identifies with a specific combination of features. Information in analytic form is a complement
to, rather than a substitute for, trademarks.").
32
Cf id at 524 ('he same symbols can mean different things to different individuals. But, by and large the
convention which identifies symbols and words with some minimally defined mental images at a certain point in
time for a certain group of people, allows communication and civilization to continue." (footnote omitted)).
"3Jeremy N. Sheff, BiasingBrand, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1288 (2011). See Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heurstics and Biases, SCi., Sept 27, 1974, at 1124, 1130,
[https//perrmcc/3KN8https'/Avww.socsci.uci.edu/- bskyrmsbio/readings/tv rsky kheuristics biases.pdf
6P9C], for a discussion of the availability heuristic, which is our tendency to accord greater weight to information
that comes immediately to mind This issue was known before trademark scholars had the language of psychology
to describe it. As Ralph Brown wrote decades ago:

With time, the symbol comes to be more than a conduit through which the persuasive power of
the advertising is transmitted, and acquires a potency, a "commercial magnetism," of its own.
One of the oldest of advertising techniques, the simple reiteration of the brand name,
contributes to this result. Early advertising artists aspired to deface every natural monument
with such forgotten symbols as "Sapolio." Their successors, no longer earthbound, write the
bare syllables "Pepsi-Cola" in the sky. If those who crane
their necks at the sky-writing are
unable to blurt any name but Pepsi-Cola to the soda-clerk, the symbol obviously has
commercial value. Even though its continued nurture requires continued outlays, the distillation
of past displays and jingles and art exhibits into a word makes that word of great price, quite
independently of the vats and alchemy that produce the drink.
Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the PublicInterest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE
L.J. 1165, 1187-88 (1948) (footnotes omitted).
14 As with the case of generic pain relievers like acetaminophen and naproxen sodium compared to
the respective brands of TYLENOL and ALEVE. Sarah Kliff, Shop like a Pharmacist:Don't Buy Advil,
Vox (May 10, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2014/7/25/5936739/shop-like-a-pharmacist-dont-buy-advil
[https://perma.cc/L6BW-3JXZ]; see also Julia Belluz, Stop Wasting Money on Brand-nameDrugs, VOX
(Feb. 16, 2016, 9:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/2/16/11008134/generic-drugs-safe-effectivecheaper [https://perma.cc/MGC9-UX3C] ("The existing body of high-quality evidence suggests that
generic drugs consistently meet [the FDA's equivalence-to-branded-medicine] requirements. So there's
generally little downside to switching to generics. The only difference (in most cases) is that they're less
of a burden on the wallet.").
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another in which the seller lacks comparable expertise. Here too, the availability
heuristic might lead consumers to a suboptimal result.35
Another error emanates from the prospect that the trademark carries too much
information to be interpreted properly.3 6 It may be helpfil to use a brand as a proxy,
but at the end of the day, an APPLE MacBook is not an APPLE MacBook AIR is
not an APPLE MacBook Pro is not an APPLE iPhone 7 (or 8 or 9 or X) is not an
APPLE iPad, and so on- Strong marks may cause us to overlook distinctions of this sort
Courts face similar challenges in adjudicating trademark cases. Judges routinely
wrestle with the issue of whether to protect not only a mark's source-identifying
function, but also its more extended meanings. Because a trademark (or a lookalike)
conveys a range of potential meanings, courts sometimes worry about the possibility
of harm from non-source messages that might be conveyed by a mark.37 Even when
these stories of harm are open to doubt, courts may feel pressure to credit them lest
they undermine the overarching structure of trademark law.38
But the Al of the thought experiment could address these concerns. It need not
economize on search costs in the same way humans do, for the source of its utility is
its superior ability to sift through the context that we seek to avoid. It would know
the difference between the many different products sharing, say, the APPLE mark
and base recommendations accordingly. Likewise, you may be nervous about trying
a new brand when your current choice satisfies well enough, but an AI would be
designed for the labor of calculating whether the risk is worth it.
An Al could also account for some of the issues that lead courts to grant strong
trademark rights even in the absence of potential diverted sales. Consider Maker's
Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo North America, Inc.39 Maker's Mark, which makes
bourbon, sued a tequila producer for using a red wax seal purportedly similar to its
own (which is registered as a trademark).4" Notwithstanding differences in
" For example, if COCA-COLA were to release a beer, consumers might transfer their good feelings
for the soda to the new product and try it. If the product is poor, they suffer a form of harm inflicted by
the mark's selling power. The "error" arises from bounded rationality. It might not have been worth the
trouble to thoroughly explore whether there was any reason to think that the soda maker is capable of
making a quality beer. The trademark shortcut could blind us to more obvious contextual data, as when a
consumer who enjoys COCA-COLA's sweet taste buys COCA-COLA beer without noting that it is
marketed as a bitter beer. To be sure, there may be a market check on this kind of conduct. The data is
unclear, however, as to whether consumers would actually punish a trademark holder in its home market.
See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 140-41 (2010)
("[T]he empirical evidence confirms both that third parties can benefit from uses of known marks in
markets ancillary to the senior mark owner's and that those third-party uses can impair the senior user's
ability to expand its own product lines. Put another way, the evidence suggests that third parties like Black
& Decker might benefit from use of, or proximity to, SUM's trademarks, but not that SUM is harmed by
such use." (footnotes omitted)).
36Cf Brown, supra note 33, at 1189 (observing that marks may "be the vehicle of persuasion, either
because of extensive repetition and embellishment apart from their use on goods, or because the advertiser
has selected and somehow appropriated to his exclusive use a symbol which independently predisposes
the customer to buy").
37See, e.g., Maker's Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 419 (6th Cir. 2012);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772-73 (8th Cir. 1994).
'8 See Grynberg, supra note 27, at 46, 51-52.
39Maker's Mark, 679 F.3d at 410-25.
40
d. at 414, 417.
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products,4 price points, and labels, all of which limited the risk of a mistaken
purchase due to source confusion, Maker's Mark prevailed.4 2 The court perceived an
intolerable potential for affiliation confusion-the prospect that consumers might see
a similar wax seal and muse about the prospect of a connection between the two
products-noting that "many consumers are unaware of the affiliations between
brands of distilled spirits, and that some companies produce multiple types of
distilled spirits."4' 3
There is much to criticize in the court's speculations," but let us assume arguendo
that: a) consumers might indeed make this leap; and b) that the potential
misperception of affiliation would be material to a purchasing decision.45 Although
information about the actual connection, if any, between the two producers is likely
publicly available, we do not expect a potential purchaser to look for it while in the
aisles of a liquor store. Even if everyone had a smart phone and data plan, web
searches take time. We there allow reliance on a simple trademark signal. But sorting
out these questions would be trivial for an Al.
An AI,moreover, could transcend the need for this information. To see why, we
should ask why affiliation information might be relevant.46 Why would a tequila
consumer care if there were a connection between a potential purchase and a bourbon
producer? After all, shouldn't the question turn on the tequila's qualities? One
possible answer is that affiliation with a quality bourbon is a proxy for quality. On
this logic, if Maker's Mark makes a quality bourbon, it will protect its goodwill by
being careful in entering into affiliation agreements. If so, all things being equal, a
tequila affiliated with Maker's Mark is likely to satisfy Maker's Mark fans.
But there is typically much better evidence available from other
sources-reviews, seller product information, message board discussions, etc. That
data is, however, more expensive as a matter of a consumer's search costs than
drawing inferences by simply looking at a mark. Maybe it is easier to make
assumptions based on bottle appearance. An Al would alter the equation. Because it
could accumulate data at a low cost, it would have no need to rely on the trademark's
ability to convey affiliation information. In short, it would have immediate access
to: (a) accurate affiliation information if relevant; and (b) superior information that
might make affiliation data irrelevant.47
4' Although tequila is a spirit, it is not distilled from a grain like bourbon, which must have a
majority-corn base. 27 C.F.R. § 5.22(b)(1)(i), (g); see also Maker's Mark, 679 F.3d at 415, 423.
42 Maker's Mark, 679 F.3d at 414, 423-25.
43Id. at 422. For that reason, the court discounted the presence of the defendant's entirely distinct
house mark. Id.(agreeing with the lower court that "the presence of a house mark... is more significant
in a palming off case than in an association case").
"Grynberg, supra note 27, at 41-45.
4'Though there is no materiality requirement in infringement litigation, materiality in this case would
go a long way to justifying the outcome as a matter of policy.
46 To be sure, I believe the relevance to be minimal outside of direct sponsorship settings--that is
situations in which the markholder stands behind the quality of a third party's goods-but I am assuming
arguendo that it matters.
4'This example shows a potential pitfall of a less advanced Al that might pay too much attention to
trademarks rather than sorting through the more directly relevant context and specific information for
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B. What's left?
The thought experiment thus highlights some of the tradeoffs underlying today's
trademark system. Trademarks help organize information into simple signals that
promote efficiency at the expense of nuance and context. The balance, coupled with
the law that protects it, is likely helpful to consumers when calibrated to a given level
of human cognition. But the proper scope of trademark law may change if new tools
enhance our effective cognition. Change the assumptions enough, and much of what
makes trademark attractive-information simplification-looks less like the solution
to a problem and more like a problem to be solved.
What then happens to trademark law in a world of extremely sophisticated AI?
What would be left for it to do?
i.Maintaining distributive fairness
Of course, an Al future may not (and if past is prologue, will not) be equitably
distributed. The demands of distributive justice may therefore create a potential
foothold for traditional trademark law to persist. Perhaps the hypothesized Als will
not be available to all or maybe a significant amount of commerce will persist in
realms that the Al cannot easily operate (e.g., face-to-face interactions).4" This could
be seen as another issue of intermediate technology. Instead of addressing an Al that
is advanced but imperfect, this question is of an Al that is perfect enough, but
unevenly distributed.
Though distributive concerns may indeed preserve room for trademark law to
operate, the amount of room may be less than might initially appear. First, if we are
concerned with life online (or the future equivalent) then the wealth gap issue might
at least be mitigated by the relative low cost of digital technology compared to
physical goods (assuming that difference persists in the future). 49 And if life offline
is the issue, trademark law could be calibrated to operate with greater scope offline
°
This calibration could also attend to the interests of those for whom the act
than on.'
of shopping is a pleasure unto itself (though perhaps these are consumers for whom
sifting through context is part of the fin).
Second, even if top-of-the-line Als are imperfectly distributed, lesser and more
available technologies may be good enough to justify weakening trademark law. This
assumes that the weakening translates into an improved marketplace. From a welfare
perspective any trademark costs to consumers must be weighed against potential

which the marks are an imprecise stand-in.
48 But who knows what developments will arise with augmented reality technology.

4 Though perhaps this opens the door to battles as sophisticated As seek to deceive other
sophisticated AIs. Maybe this leaves room for trademark to operate, but the requisite judgments may be
better suited to false advertising law. See infra Section ll.B.3.
"0The early experience with trademarks on the internet was, however, the opposite. See generally Eric
Goldman, BrandSpillovers, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 381, 383 (2009) ("]nlike retailers' use of brand spillovers,
online brand spillover activities have been repeatedly attacked in courts and legislatures.").
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benefits in the actual marketplace (e.g., by lowering licensing costs and, therefore,
prices).51
ii. Preserving a residual core
Another possibility is trademark law will still be needed to ensure that consumers
get what their AIs order. But this residual core of trademark law, if necessary, is far
narrower than today's doctrine. The kind of meaning that would need
protection-designation of source at the point of sale/delivery-is a faint shadow of
what trademark law protects today. In the AI world, there is no need for brand
personality, dilution protection, affiliation or sponsorship claims, or the like. Nor is
there a need--outside of the prestige goods context discussed below 2-for attractive
or memorable marks. To a computer, ZL3XC!7K4BV functions just as well as
APPLE. But because the Al is able to find quality goods (however defined), the seller
retains an incentive to invest in quality (and, indeed, might have more resources to
do so if freed from a need to invest in the now irrelevant attribute of trademark
attractiveness).5 3 Or trademark law could be restricted to a smaller signifier.
So anyone could brand their computer APPLE, but only one company could use the
®, or some like symbol, when it comes time to ship.
Nor is it entirely clear that an Al could not distinguish authentic from
non-authentic goods even without a trademark residual. Imagine seeing luxury
branded merchandise for sale on a street comer. No matter how authentic it looks,
the context likely alerts you to the strong possibility that the products are
counterfeits. The Al would likely have access to considerably more distinguishing
context and the ability to sort it.
iii. Everything is false advertising
Perhaps there will be more work, relatively speaking, for the Lanham Act's false
advertising cause of action.' Presumably, advertising would continue to shape the
consumer preferences that constitute an input to the Al's work, leaving room for
false advertising doctrine to operate.
One question is the relative balance of trademark and false advertising law in
efforts by sellers to "game" imperfect Als, perhaps by using powerful computers of
51See

infra Section II.C.

52 See infra Section 11.B.4. Mark attractiveness might be an issue to the extent scarcity or cachet is
the relevant "product," but those attributes can be manufactured in other ways.
" To be sure, however, one consequence might be that marks may lose the placebo effect that comes
from mark strength. See, e.g., Kate Faasse et al., Impact of Brand or Generic Labeling on Medication
Effectiveness andSide Effects, 35 HEALTH PSYCH. 187, 187 (2016). While this is often seen as reflective
of manipulation by marketing, a recent article sees the placebo effect of trademarks as potentially salutary.
Jake Linford, Placebo Marks, 47 PEPP. L. REv. 45, 112-13 (2019) ("These studies suggest that in the
market for high-performance goods, consumers may derive value from the branding myths they are sold.
The Nike brand may work like Dumbo's feather in the famous Disney film--it may not matter why
consumers believe they can fly, so long as they believe it."). In any case, the authority of the Al could
well 54
imbue its choices with a placebo effect of its own.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2018).
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their own. The differing foci of the two doctrines suggest that false advertising will
have a greater role to play in an Al world-at least if the concern is with deception.
Trademark law is oriented around simple signals that embody broader meanings.
contrast, looks to the message as a whole.55 It is therefore
False advertising law, by
56
sensitive.
more context
This orientation would better serve efforts to police activities that mislead Als.
Because the hypothesized Als focus on context and not trademarks alone, mere
trademark use is comparatively unlikely to mislead an Al of sufficient sophistication.
We might, however, posit circumstances in which surrounding context is fabricated
in a way designed to game the Als. False advertising law, with its demand that
actionable communications be both perceived and material, is better positioned to
respond to acts that might result in mistaken purchases.
iv. Everything is unfair competition and the problem of prestige goods
Or trademark law might discard any pretense of focusing on consumer protection
and return to the unfair competition tradition.57 Judges might adjudicate what is or is
not acceptable behavior in the commercial marketplace without necessarily focusing
on consumer confusion. This could be the mechanism by which they continue to
police competition in status goods or promotional merchandise, with underlying
views of what is "sporting" in the marketplace, substituting for today's strained
stories about possible consumer confusion.58 But without confusion, these moral
judgments will need a coherent theory if the resulting law is to be transparent and
predictable.59

" See Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH, 843 F.3d 48, 65 (2d Cir.
2016) ("To prevail on a Lanham Act false advertising claim, a plaintiff must establish that the challenged
message is I either literally or impliedly false ....).
56 Moreover, the doctrine makes distinctions between explicit and implied falsehoods, requiring
plaintiffs to establish that consumers actually perceive the implied falsehood. E.g., Time Warner Cable,
Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 2007). The doctrine further considers context by
requiring materiality and excluding from liability statements that are mere puffery. E.g., Pizza Hut, Inc.
v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 495-96 (5th Cir. 2000).
17Passage of the Lanham Act in 1946 unified federal trademark protection in one body of law. See I
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4:3 (5th ed. 2019).

Federal statutory protection was once restricted to "technical trademarks," which would be called arbitrary
and fanciful marks today. Id. The law of unfair competition covered what were then known as trade names
but are now treated as trademarks. Id. Both types of marks are now protected by the Lanham Act. Id.
"i As when the Ninth Circuit used trademark law to prevent the use of popular trademarks for
automobiles as raw material for complementary goods such as keychains or license-plate frames.
Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2006). Though the
court undertook its analysis under the multifactor test, id.at 1078, the opinion seems more shaped by the
reaction that the challenged use was "nothing more than naked appropriation of the marks," id. at 1064.
" It is worth noting, however, that trademark law may be making room for explorations of this sort.
The Lexmark International,Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. decision may breathe new power into
the Lanham Act's reference to the prevention of"unfair competition" as a statutory purpose. See Lexmark
Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 131-32, 136 (2014). Recent precedent from
the Fourth Circuit, moreover, suggests that courts may be interested in exploring a law of unfair
competition that is broader than trademark alone. See Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819
F.3d 697, 701, 706-08 (4th Cir. 2016).
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Judges already use trademark law to regulate competition in a variety of areas in
which source confusion is unlikely. Courts have used the Lanham Act to give
trademark holders control of the promotional goods/merchandising market
(e.g., preventing third parties from selling baseball caps with professional team
logos) and the market for prestige goods (e.g., using post-sale confusion theories to
prevent the selling of knockoff products even when the buyer is aware that the
product does not come from the trademark holder).6"
These extensions of trademark law are controversial for a number of reasons, and
they rest doctrinally on confusion theories that generally fall outside of the source
confusion model.61 In the hypothesized AI world, in which confusion is eliminated
by automatic consideration of context, these theories would be less viable. Perhaps
a result will be the lower prices for consumers that come with competition.
Alternatively, today's prohibitions would remain, but they might be liberated
from their strained confusion stories. Defenders of post-sale confusion and
merchandising rights theories generally do not rely on confusion rationales. Rather,
they focus on considerations of promoting incentives,62 deterring free riding,63 and
policing morality. 64 These rationales are simply unnecessary to a trademark law
grounded in preventing passing off and source confusion, and they have always been
an uneasy fit with trademark doctrine as a whole. But in a world in which source,
confusion is harder to come by, they may become the new core of trademark law. If
the link to source confusion is severed, perhaps the resulting law of luxury and
promotional markets could be founded on a non-confusion theory that offers greater
clarity to future judges of what they are trying to accomplish.
C. What's gained?
To say that an Al-enabled world of consumer consumption does not need
trademark law is not the same as saying we would be better off without it. What then
might be gained by scaling back trademark law as we know it today? Here, too, much
depends on how one imagines the state of intermediate technologies and their
distribution.
i. Legalizing competition
As suggested in the last subpart, a major potential benefit would be the
legalization of products and services threatened or prohibited by current trademark
law and lower prices in prestige or promotional merchandise.6 5 As noted above,
however, the intuition that these markets "belong" to trademark holders is powerful
60E.g., Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2000); Boston Prof'l
Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).
61See, e.g., Herme.s, 219 F.3d at 108; Boston ProflHockey, 510 F.2d at 1012.
62

See, e.g., Boston Profl Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1011.
e.g., Au-Tomotive Gold,457 F.3d at 1064, 1067.

63 See,

64See, e.g., Herms, 219 F.3d at 108-09.
61 See supra Section II.B.4.
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and likely to generate another cause of action to replace the one that is lost.' Even
this may be a gain, as a new cause of action would be liberated from incoherent
theories of consumer confusion.
ii. Opening communications channels
Another potential benefit of weakening trademark in an Al world is that sellers
would have the benefit of enhanced communication channels to consumers. A maker
of acetaminophen could, for example, simply brand itself as TYLENOL, leaving it
to consumer avatars to sort out which is the "authentic" brand for purchasers who
actually care about the difference. Because the brand name conveys useful product
information, weakened trademark law would enable an easy way of communicating
a product attribute (as TYLENOL conveys non-brand information that "pain
reliever" does not).
This point should not be oversold. A world in which AI confusion is impossible
is one in which the Al would be alert to the prospect of generic brands. In today's
market, for example, a price-sensitive consumer who is indifferent to whether her
acetaminophen is TYLENOL may or may not know of the availability of generic
alternatives. Our hypothesized Al would not suffer this difficulty and would simply
order the cheaper generic equivalent for its consumer (assuming that it would satisfy
would not be put off by the comparative
the consumer's preference). An Al 67
clunkiness of the term acetaminophen.
Another possible answer would be to focus not on the consumer-side Al but
rather the seller's advertising costs. So a seller may wish to use a trademarked term
as the most efficient way to communicate the non-trademark information that the
term embodies (in the drug example, "my product is like TYLENOL"). If forced to
incur the costs of advertising without the trademarked term, the seller may have to
Als are good enough, the costs of marketing to them
raise prices. But again, if the
68
should likewise be limited.
Perhaps a more promising answer is to focus on trademark litigation's potential
as a weapon between market competitors. Even if sellers do not "need" plaintiff
marks, many legitimate activities may nonetheless provoke trademark claims. A
seller may, for example, design a product that looks similar to a claimed trade dress
66 See supraSection II.B.4.
67 But there is an effect in a world of intermediate Als, which may be gamed on the one hand, or fail

to seize opportunities on the other. Here, confusion costs would have to be weighed against benefits. See
generally Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60 (2008).
68 We might also see the issue as one of speech protection. A "counterfeit" mark might provide relevant

information to the Al. Suppose you are in the market for a cheap watch, and you see three $15
options: A well-known discount brand, an unknown cheap brand, and an obviously fake ROLEX. The counterfeit
use of ROLEX (which does not deceive you) conveys information about the product that bears it
If the Al is incapable of confusion, then stopping "counterfeits" becomes another way of saying,
"don't tell the machine this," rather than a means of preventing harmful deception. This raises First
Amendment concerns. Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 734 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(noting that statutes and doctrines that prohibit false statements "limit the scope of their application,
sometimes by requiring proof of specific harm to identifiable victims; sometimes by specifying that the
lies be made in contexts in which a tangible harm to others is especially likely to occur, and sometimes
by limiting the prohibited lies to those that are particularly likely to produce harm").
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for functional reasons. Or a seller may use a trademarked term in a descriptive way.
These legitimate activities create openings for trademark-based attacks.
Today, such cases require courts to sort through difficult questions, e.g., whether
product designs have sufficient secondary meaning for trademark protection,
whether designs are functional, whether consumers are likely to be confused by
similar competitor designs, and so on. To the extent the underlying claims are
than consumer
fundamentally
about preserving market share-rather
69
protection-limiting them would promote competition.
iii. Protecting free expression
A final benefit of ending trademark law as we know it is eliminating infringement
litigation (or its threat) as a tool of censorship of expressive trademark uses. The
unauthorized use of trademark for expressive purposes may benefit the public by, for
example, enriching culture or providing an avenue for commentary. For many of
these uses-unlike the traditional passing off setting-the junior user is unable to
adopt a non-confusing distinctive mark. Using an already-known trademark is part
of the message.
Current trademark doctrine mediates the potential interference with free
expression in a variety of ways.7" Though generally effective when push comes to
shove,7 trademark law's safeguards for free expression may not be enough to blunt
the in terroremeffect of a cease and desist letter for those with limited access to legal
advice. And those without a taste for litigation may simply trim their sails in the face
of a plausible sounding trademark claim.72 If courts can trust the AI,the technology
would eliminate this tactic.
D. The "death of trademark" in a bespoke world
As the saying goes, predictions are hard, especially about the future,73 but the
thought experiment helps illuminate the functions of trademarks today. Trademarks
exist in a world of limited cognition. They, and the law that protects them, are one
way of addressing marketplace information problems. But they are not mandatory.
Our use of trademarks is the product of a particular context. If and when our abilities
improve, trademarks may become superfluous. At the least, the current equilibrium
that justifies a particular scope for trademark law may reset at another level.
69 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000) (noting the importance of
providing an avenue "for summary disposition of an anticompetitive strike suit").
70 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)
(protecting nominative uses from liability); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998-1000 (2d Cir. 1989)
(protecting artistically relevant uses from liability).
71But see Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 271-72 (9th Cir. 2018) (remanding trademark claim
for further proceedings notwithstanding existence of an artistically relevant use by the defendant).
72 Cf Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213-14; see generally James Gibson, Risk A version and Rights Accretion
in Intellectual PropertyLaw, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 913 (2007).
73It's Difficult to Make Predictions, EspeciallyAbout the Future, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Oct. 20,
2013), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/10/20/no-predict/ [https://perma.cc/ZF8V-JKVJ].
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It turns out the current trademark equilibrium is already under pressure from
artificial intelligence. Although the AI of the thought experiment is not at hand, its
forerunners can be seen in the74marketplace, and they already affect trademark law,
as discussed in Part IV below.
But the thought experiment highlights another tension within modem trademark
doctrine. The hypothetical Al is a digital creature at home on the internet. It acts not
by relying on any particular source of information, but rather by filtering the mass of
data available online. As the next Part explains, that model is at odds with how
information-including trademark information-was managed prior to the advent of
the internet.
11. KNOWLEDGE ONLINE AND TRADEMARKS

In our hypothetical, the Al avatar is a filter. It sorts and categorizes the myriad of
resources available online and distills a message on behalf of its beneficiary
consumer. This is a familiar way to gather information online. If interested in
exploring a subject, we might rely on a filter (like Google) to narrow the range of
possibilities before us. But the filtered out possibilities remain available to those
using alternative screens or search terms.
Information gathering was different in a world of comparative information
scarcity. No newspaper could contain all the stories of the day; no library all the
books; no television channel all the shows. Choices had to be made, and with the
editors, librarians, and
necessity of choice came the requirement of authorities-the
75
station managers--to curate what we could see.
The powerful forces unleashed by the internet changed that. In many ways,
however, trademark law functions in a way akin to the old scarcity model, creating
challenges for its accommodation to life online.
A. Knowledge Online and Trademarks
How do people come to rely on the opinions of others and find the information
on which they rely? For many, the abundance of information online changes the
answer to this question by altering the way knowledge is aggregated and curated.
The role of gatekeepers used to be larger. 76 We once consumed information from a

74 See infra Part IV.
75 David Weinberger describes how the physical limits of communications media shaped the
institutions that used them:
Traditional knowledge is what you get when paper is its medium. There is nothing mystical
about this. For example, if your medium doesn't easily allow you to correct mistakes,
knowledge will tend to be carefully vetted. If it's expensive to publish, then you will create
mechanisms that winnow out contenders. If you're publishing on paper, you will create
centralized locations where you amass books.... Traditional knowledge has been an accident
of paper.
WEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 45.
76 See id. at 3-4.
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set of relatively constrained options, choosing what to view only after others had, by
necessity, made a great many choices. As David Weinberger explains:
Our most basic strategy for understanding a world that far outruns our
brain's capacity has been to filter, winnow, and otherwise reduce it to
something more manageable. We've managed the fire hose by reducing
the flow. We've done this through an elaborate system of editorial filters
that have prevented most of what's written from being published, through
an elaborate system of curatorial filters that has kept most of what's been
published from being shelved in our local libraries and bookstores, and
through an elaborate system of professional filters that have kept many of
us from being responsible for knowing most of what's made it through the
77
other filters. Knowledge has been about reducing what we need to know.
This is largely a byproduct of scarcity. There are only so many library shelves, pages
in a newspaper, broadcast television channels, etc. Publishing houses could print
only so many books. Radio and television broadcast networks were expensive to
create, and the transmission spectrum was managed as a scarce resource.78 And so on.
Enter the experts. Authorities (libraries, universities, newspapers, etc.) acted as
curators of knowledge, effectively determining the bounds of the conventional
wisdom.79 One need not ascribe censorial motives to this arrangement. The existence
to the prevailing
of gatekeepers, of experts curating "correct" answers, was inherent
80
technology-a world of limited shelf space requires choices.
On the internet, of course, things are different. Scarcity of supply is not a
problem, as for all practical purposes the shelf space is infinite. The problem is
finding one's preferred signal amid the surrounding noise. 8 We therefore need a
different class of experts. Instead of depending on librarians and editors who select
from the submissions of information providers and leave the rest unavailable, we rely
on filters, algorithms, and social networks to predict what we want to see and leave
the remaining mass intact and undifferentiated.8 2 But the "wrong" answers remain
available for those who see them as correct. The internet in turn connects adherents
of the old
to these alternative premises and forms communities that resist the ability
83
gatekeepers to make effective pronouncements on contested issues.
77Id.at 3-4.
78Gregory Staple & Kevin Werbach, The End ofSpectrum Scarcity, SPECTRUM (Mar. 1,2004, 15:16 GMT),

https://specrum.ieee.org/telecom/wireless/the-end-of-spectuum-scarcity [httpsJipermacc/D6BD-KQB 8].
79See WEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 3-4. This is a comparative point, as there has always been
dissenting opinions and narratives.
'°See id.
at 5.
"' See id.at 45 ("The Internet is what you get when everyone is a curator and everything is linked.").
In some respects, this is nothing new, as "[t]here was always too much to know, but now that fact is
thrown in our faces at every turn. Now we know there's too much for us to know." Id. at 11.
82 See id. at 11 ("Filters no longer filter out. They filter forward, bringing their results to the front.
What doesn't make it through a filter is still visible and available in the background.").
83See id.at 45 ("The Internet simply doesn't have what it takes to create a body of knowledge: No
editors and curators who get to decide what is in or out. No agreed-upon walls to let us know that
knowledge begins here, while outside uncertainty reigns-at least none that everyone accepts.").
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Democratizing knowledge in this way has not been an unalloyed good, as seen
in the 2016 presidential election campaign. 84 Multiple parallel knowledge
communities may develop world views from their own selected body of facts,
selected in a filtering process by members of a network.8 5 The all-too-familiar
problem of ideological filter bubbles is one result. Partisan Democrats and
Republicans perceive reality in very different ways as do those on opposite sides of
debates over gun control or climate change. This is also true of smaller groups. Many
communities organize and define themselves around premises that are fundamentally
irreconcilable with those held by mainstream society. Some of these may seem
harmless enough to just be fodder for ridicule (e.g., flat earthers).86 Others carry
higher emotional stakes (e.g., "9/11 'truthers"' and "birthers") 87 and cause direct,
real-world harm (e.g., disease outbreaks traceable to anti-vaccine misinformation). 88
Regardless of the consequences of online communities holding incompatible
visions of truth, that reality seems here to stay.89 No amount of argument, no matter
the consensus in society at large, is going to convince the birther that President
Obama was born in the United States. More data isn't going to convince the
anti-vaccine crusaders of the dangers of their cause no matter the costs to the rest of
US.90

But this is an article about trademarks. How does trademark law fit into the
evolution described above? I have two points. First, trademark information has
traditionally been managed in a manner consistent with the scarcity model. Second,
the conflicting internet model of information abundance places pressure upon
trademark law. Trademark law seeks to manage the shelf space, so to speak, by
constraining meanings associated with a mark. The intemet model would allow the
proliferation of meanings, relying on filters to distinguish "authorized" views
(i.e., those approved by trademark owners) from conflicting information, which
remains available for those who want it. In this way, the internet model foreshadows
the world of the AI hypothesized in the previous parts. The closer technology gets to
making it a reality, the weaker trademark law may become.
84

See generally,e.g., DAVID E. SANGER, THE PERFECT WEAPON 171-93 (1st ed. 2018).
85See WEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 10-12.
86
See John Timmer, Why Does Flat Earth Belief Still Exist?, ARS TECHNiCA (Dec. 28, 2018, 10:30 AM),
https://arstechnicacom/science2018/12why-does-flat-ea-belief-stiU-exist/[htlps//perma.c/ZS56-7WYG].

87See, e.g., Chris Bell, The People Who Think 9/11 May Have Been an 'InsideJob,' BBC: NEWS
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-42195513

[https://perma.cc/FAS3-XCSB];

Lily Rothman, This is How the Whole Birther Thing Actually Started, TIME (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://time.com/ 4496792/birther-rumor-started/ [https://perma.cc/VAT2-KMAR].
88 See Elizabeth Cohen & John Bonifield, Her Son Died. And then Anti-vaxers Attacked Her,
CNN: HEALTH (Mar. 21, 2019, 2:47 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/19/health/anti-vax-harassmenteprise/index.html [https://perma.cc/QMF8-MXKR]; cf WEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 151 ("Science is
not going to be able to reassert its old-style authority because it has lost the medium that enabled it to
flourish: a one-way channel in which there were those who spoke and those who listened.").
89
See WEINBERGER, supranote 2, at xiii ("[W]e are in a crisis of knowledge at the same time that we
are in an epochal exaltation of knowledge. We fear for the institutions on which we have relied for
trustworthy knowledge, but there's also a joy we can feel pulsing though our culture. It comes from a
different place. It comes from the networking of knowledge.").
90 Id. at 181 ("There is nothing you can say to convince some people. The old Enlightenment ideal
was far more plausible when what we saw of the nattering world came through filters that hid the vast,
disagreeable bulk of disagreement.").
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This reflects a tension in trademark jurisprudence that began in the late 1990s.
Some judges initially doubled down on the scarcity model, expanding the authority
of trademark holders. 9' As discussed below, however, the logic of the internet
information model of abundance has proven too powerful for trademark doctrine to
ignore.
B. Trademarks and the stability of meaning
To return to trademark basics, trademarks (and service marks) identify and
distinguish goods (and services) in the marketplace and serve consumers by
simplifying information.92 This function requires relative stability of meaning for the
trademark itself. COCA-COLA does not work as a source identifier if the term
delineates competing brands of soda. Stated another way, the "space" in the term for
source-identifying meanings is limited if a trademark is to perform an
information-economizing function.
In the brick-and-mortar world this traditionally meant that someone must define
the mark. Trademark law therefore gives mark owners a favored position in curating
trademark information by letting them police the use of confusingly similar marks. 93
This protects not only source information but also the marks' ability to embody seller
goodwill with consumers.94 By being the only ones authorized to designate what the
mark's source meaning represents, sellers manage the goodwill attached to the mark
by controlling product quality, planning advertising campaigns, interacting with
customers, and the like.
Trademarks are also partially protected from accumulating multiple source
meanings as a result of markholder conduct.9 5 Trademarks lose protection when their
owners license or assign them indiscriminately or fail to use them for extended
periods of time.96 So trademark law not only encourages active curation of meaning,
it may be said to require it.97
91

ee, eg., Allard Enters. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 249 F.3d 564, 575 (6th Cir. 2001) (vacating
district court injunction that would have precluded a concurrent junior user from any internet use of contested mark).
92 See supra Section II.A.
93See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 57, at§ 2:10
94See id. § 2:17 (defining goodwill as "that which makes tomorrow's business more than an accident.
It is the reasonable expectation of future patronage based on past satisfactory dealings" (quoting EDWARD
S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 13 (1914)).

9'See id § 3:12.
96 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018) (providing that a mark is deemed abandoned "[w]hen its use has been
discontinued with intent not to resume such use.... Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie
evidence of abandonment" and when "any course of conduct of the owner" causes the mark "to lose its
significance as a mark").
9'Many traditional limits to trademark rights may also be understood as supporting stability of
trademark meaning. See Grynberg, supra note 28, at 183-87. Marks deemed unlikely to perform a
source-identifying function are harder to protect. That is, if a term is unlikely to maintain a discrete
meaning in the marketplace, it is less likely to receive protection. Generic terms that identify product
categories may never be trademarks while descriptive terms require secondary meaning, that is, consumers
must have come to associate the term with a particular product source. Id.at 185. Even then, competitors
may continue to use the word in its original, non-trademark sense. Id.at 187.
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As discussed above, modem trademark law goes beyond the protection of source
meanings.98 This leads to the question of whether protection of non-source meanings
is necessary to secure the positive externalities that come with the creation of a
source-identifying mark.9 9 For many judges, however, this leap is plausible.
Trademark rights therefore now extend to uses that might cause consumer confusion
with respect to a markholder's approval or sponsorship as well as activities that might
dilute a famous trademark.1 "° While there is much to criticize in this expansion, it
may be described as upholding the one mark/one meaning view of trademarks.'
But though the scarcity model gives trademark holders ample power, it
traditionally contained built-in limitations. Just as a newspaper editor selects articles
only for her paper, so too were markholders limited to the geographic markets that
had defined the marks.'0 2 There is no meaning to stabilize where no one has heard of
the mark. To hold otherwise, and force junior remote users to abandon their marks,
would be to treat the senior user's trademark rights as simple property interests.
Accordingly, at common law, courts limited the scope of protection to the mark's
area ofuse and reputation.0 3 Many early cases took the principle of market definition
quite far, limiting infringement actions to cases of direct competition between the
trademark holder and the defendant. Today, of course, trademark rights reach beyond
the mark's immediate market, but proximity still matters in assessing the likelihood
of consumer confusion in an infringement suit,'" 4 and geographic scope of use still
matters absent a registration (which confers nationwide priority). 0 5
The shift to a system granting nationwide priority for registered marks arguably
made trademarks more like a property right, but it reflected a changing view of the
national economy. The drafters of the Lanham Act understood this change to be
Likewise, many defensive doctrines that shield potential trademark defendants from liability are
designed to insulate a trademark's meaning from distortion. The first-sale (or exhaustion) doctrine allows
purchasers of genuine goods to dispose of them as they wish, including by resale. 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETMON § 25:41 (5th ed. 2019). In such
cases, the trademark on the good retains its meaning--the holder of the mark remains the original source,
and the resale does not distort that information. The caveat to the doctrine comes when the reseller
undermines that expectation by altering or reconditioning the product. Id. Beyond a certain point, courts
will declare that the retained trademark no longer designates source in a meaningful way, making its
continued use deceptive. Id.
The various judicial approaches to protecting nominative trademark uses from liability are to the same
effect. A nominative use is one that uses the trademark to refer to its owner, as in comparative advertising
(e.g., PEPSI is better than COKE). Id. § 23:11. To avoid liability, such uses must not distort the mark's
original meaning by making misrepresentations about its owner. So, for example, the Ninth Circuit, which
formalizes protection of nominative uses in a "nominative fair use" test, asks whether the defendant
"falsely suggested he was sponsored or endorsed by the trademark holder." Adobe Sys. Inc. v.
Christenson, 809 F.3d 1071, 1081 (9th Cir. 2015).
" See supra Section II.A.
99 Grynberg, supranote 27, at 64-65.
'00 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c) (2018).
" For example, Judge Posner has sought tojustify dilution theory by arguing that even non-confusing
uses of a mark might interfere with consumer associations with the original mark. See Ty Inc. v. Perryman,
306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002).
02 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918).
103 See, e.g., id. at 101.
104 E.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
105 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2018).
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necessary in light of the rise of nationwide markets." °6 Likewise, greater interstate
travel made it more likely that consumers would encounter familiar marks outside of
their home market."0 7 Peaceful, remote coexistence between markholders seemed at
risk, and the Lanham Act's registration system created a mechanism to choose
between remote claimants.10 8 This logic has, however, troubling implications when
applied to the internet.
C. Stability of meaning online: Two views
How does the interet affect a trademark's information function? We might tell
two stories-one justifying expanding trademark rights and one contracting them.
Both find support in the case law.
i. The internet and the collapse of market barriers
L The story
The internet facilitates the trend to more powerful marks by further breaking
down barriers between markets. Just as the rise of national markets supported the
Lanham Act's establishment of nationwide priority for registered marks, the internet
likewise combines previously discrete markets. On this logic, the internet makes
stronger trademark rights more likely in four ways.
First, being online reduces the importance of spatial borders, uniting remote
buyers and sellers irrespective of geography. This facilitates skepticism of a strong
territoriality principle, weakening a key limitation to trademark rights. And indeed,
some judges have argued that
territoriality-based doctrines should have less room to
09
operate in the modem age.'
106See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 5 (1946) (However, trade is no longer local, but is national. Marks used in
interstate commerce are properly the subject of Federal regulation. It would seem as if national legislation along
national lines securing to the owners of trade-marks in interstate commerce definite rights should be enacted and
should be enacted now.").
107See id.

'0'
See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2018) ("Contingent on the registration of a mark on the principal register
provided by this chapter, the filing of the application to register such mark shall constitute constructive
use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in connection with the goods or
services specified in the registration against any other person except for a person [with prior use or
registration rights]." (emphasis added)).
"' For example, the Dawn Donut rule provides that even when a registered markholder has priority
over a remote junior user, no infringement remedy is possible until there is an actual likelihood of
confusion in the market. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959).
This requires the plaintiffto commence orbe likely to commence activity in the junior user's market; until
then, the junior user may be on borrowed time, but may still operate. See id. at 364. This logic has been
questioned in light of the growing ability for a mark to establish a reputation in an area absent actual sales.
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1057 (6th Cir. 1999) (Jones, J., concurring)
("The Dawn Donut Rule was enunciated in 1959. Entering the new millennium, our society is far more
mobile than it was four decades ago. For this reason, and given that recent technological innovations such
as the Internet are increasingly deconstructing geographical barriers for marketing purposes, it appears to
me that a re-examination of precedents would be timely to determine whether the Dawn Donut Rule has
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Second, the internet weakens conceptual barriers between markets, making it
easier for buyers to move between proximate, but distinct, markets. One wanting an
economy car is unlikely to wander into a MERCEDES showroom. But one searching
for, say, a KIA online may well encounter mercedes.com. Similarly, internet
merchants may use trademarks to unite even non-proximate markets from the
consumer's perspective. Suppose a seller markets MERCEDES bubble gum. In the
brick-and-mortar world, a buyer is relatively unlikely to encounter the product while
shopping for a MERCEDES automobile. Online, however, that sort of encounter is
far more likely thanks to search engines and other algorithm-driven devices that may
direct traffic to related sites and advertisements.
It is also possible that the internet increases consumer exposure to confusing
marks by increasing the velocity with which one moves between markets.
A consumer walking through a mall will encounter a variety of stores and their
affiliated marks. But the total range will be constrained both by the kinds of stores
that tend to populate the malls and the speed with which the shopper can move
around before needing to go elsewhere. Both constraints are reduced online,
potentially increasing consumer contact with similar marks in different markets. One
is more likely to bump into the marks for DELTA faucets and DELTA airlines online
than when walking through a mall.
Third, as alluded to above, the internet has introduced new mechanisms for
similar marks to come into contact. For example, a search for "pandora" has as its
top two hits the page for the online radio station and jewelry store. Or, in the case of
keyword advertising, use of a trademarked term may provoke the collision between
competing marks in display advertising accompanying search results.
Fourth, and relatedly, the internet generated new ways to use trademarks, creating
new avenues for the (alleged) weakening of mark meaning, like the use of trademarks
in domain names and keywords discussed in greater detail below.
2. The history
At the turn of this century, lawmakers expanded trademark's domain in a manner
consistent with the logic described above: If the intemet exposes more consumers to
potentially misleading mark uses, then trademark powers must be strengthened to
protect the primacy of the trademark holder's version of the mark. In the late 1990s
and early 2000s courts experimented with a range of doctrines to chase the novel
110
they
trademark uses appearing online. Judges invoked dilution theories;
recalibrated the multifactor test for online cases;"' and they invigorated the largely
dormant doctrine of initial interest confusion. 1 2 In the domain name arena, public
and private legislation stepped in to take some pressure off the courts. Congress
passed the Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"), and the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") instituted the Uniform

outlived its usefulness.").
See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998).
'
1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000).
1"
12 See, e.g., GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d
1 See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entrn't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP"), which funneled
13
trademark-based domain name disputes into the private dispute resolution process.
Many of these cases rested, in part, on the concern that consumers would
encounter trademarks in unfamiliar settings without the distinguishing context
consumers rely on in more familiar markets.114 Because the internet collapses market
boundaries, this context could not be relied upon as it had been in the past.'15
That logic seems to counsel continued growth for trademark rights if stability of
meaning is what matters. The internet puts us on a slope whose endpoint is in essence
powerful trademarks in one (global) market. But courts have not gone so far. Their
reluctance fits another story we can tell about the relationship between the internet
and trademark information.
ii. The internet and the retreat of trademark authority
. The story
We might instead view the internet as a direct attack on the trademark model of
authority. On this view, the internet's ability to undermine expert gatekeepers and
enable alternative communities of meaning, each with their own incompatible
"truths,"1

16

extends to trademarks. For example, some trademarks have different

owners in different nations. If the internet truly collapses markets in a way that
requires trademark exclusivity, this should be untenable. But of course it isn't.
Hasbro owns the SCRABBLE mark in the United States and Canada; a subsidiary of
Mattel owns it in the rest of the world." 7 The internet lets consumers become aware
of these incompatible uses and, with filtering, they may choose an extraterritorial
definition of SCRABBLE. As it is, SCRABBLE-related web pages of both
companies are accessible online." 8 Life goes on. Internet users are capable of
13Michael Grynberg, More Than IP: Trademark Among the Consumer Information Laws, 55 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1429, 1485--86 (2014).
...
See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,1025 (9th Cir. 2004)
(arguing that online ads keyed to trademark terms might constitute infringement even if consumers
immediately realize upon landing on the linked website that it is unrelated to the plaintiff); GoTo.com,
Inc., 202 F.3d at 1206 ("Whereas in the world of bricks and mortar, one may be able to distinguish easily
between an expensive restaurant in New York and a mediocre one in Los Angeles, the Web is a very
different world." (citation omitted)).
"' See GoTo.com, Inc., 202 F.3d at 1205 ("In the context of the Web in particular, the three most
important Sleekcraft factors are (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness of the goods or services,
and (3) the 'simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing channel."' (citation omitted)).
See supra Section III.A.
17 Welcome to the Official Worldwide SCRABBLE Home Page, SCRABBLE, www.scrabble.com

116

[https://perma.cc/B2K2-UBD6] ("SCRABBLE® is a registered trademark. All intellectual property rights
in and to the game are owned in the U.S.A and Canada by Hasbro Inc., and throughout the rest of the
world by J.W. Spear & Sons Limited of Maidenhead, Berkshire, England, a subsidiary of Mattel Inc.
Mattel and Spear are not affiliated with Hasbro.").
118

Compare

Scrabble,

MATrEL

GAMES,

http://www.mattelgames.com/en-my/scrabble

[httpsJ/perma.cc/U8X2-KX5U] (showing the Mattel Scrabble website for the game available outside of the United
States and Canada), with SCRABBLE, https://scrabble.hasbro.com/en-us [https://pemma.cc/S6Z9-RGJZ] (showing the
Hasbro Scrabble website for the game available in the United States and Canada).
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segmenting themselves into belief communities that dispute the curvature of the
earth; the ability to vary trademark definitions seems trivial in comparison)' 9
Moreover, the accumulation and persistence of data online likely make this state
of affairs inevitable. No amount of trademark policing will remove all references to
alternative mark uses. Even if, for example, the European Union were to convince
20
the United States to grant certification mark rights to "parmesan" cheese,' the
shelves
store
after
long
existing generic uses of the term would likely linger online
come into compliance. This would also be true of infringing uses, for stamping them
out not only requires removing all directly infringing uses, which is difficult, but also
any references to them, which is impossible if the referrals are not themselves
actionable. To the extent nothing is forgotten online, fodder for alternative trademark
narratives will likely always be present. While this may undermine trademark
reliability in some cases, it also unlocks positive information externalities by
allowing sellers to communicate brand similarity where such uses do not create a
risk of source confusion at the point of sale. 2 '
2. The history
Early online trademark cases were notorious for treating consumers as incapable
of appreciating the context of certain novel trademark uses. For example, defendants
faced liability for attempts to be listed in a search engine result for trademarked
terms.' 22 The fact that the defendant websitewas clearly distinguishable from the
plaintiffs' often did not matter. 2324The harm, such as it was, was the potential errant
click from a search results page.'
Though the logic of these cases rested to a large extent on free-riding
considerations, they treated the act of arriving on the "wrong" site as something
beyond the consumer's control and, therefore, responsibility. 25 Over time, however,
courts have gradually become more appreciative of consumers' ability to consider
sophisticated as
context.'26 They are increasingly likely to see internet users as more
1 27
a normative matter, regardless of whether this is true empirically.
12
The shift can be seen in the Ninth Circuit's treatment of Amazon.com, which
in some ways might be seen as a forerunner of the hypothesized Al of the thought
119 In the Scrabble case, of course, the companies are marketing a game that is largely, though not

completely, identical. In other cases, a similar mark name might involve greater differences from nation
to nation. See generally, e.g., Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002)
two companies with the same rights to use "Harrods" in separate geographic regions).
(discussing
120
in the United States, many cheeses claim to be "parmesan" but the certification mark for the region-specific
product is PARMIGIANO-REGGIANO. See PARMIGIANO-REGGIANO, Registration No. 1,896,683.
121 Grynberg, supranote 27, at 62 n.215, 62-63.
122
See e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,1062-67 (9th Cir. 1999).
123 See, e.g., id. at 1062.
124See i.
121 See generallyMichael Grynberg, The RoadNot Takenr InitialInterest Confusion, Conswner Search Costs,
and the Challengeof the Internet, 28 SEATMLE U. L. REV. 97 (2004) (providing an analysis of case law).
126 See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2010).
127 Compare id. at 1178 (contending that consumers who shop on the internet are generally
sophisticated), with id. at 1185-86 (Fernandez, J., concurring) (disputing contention).
128 See Multi Time Mach., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2015) (issuing a
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experiment. It is highly algorithmic; it functions in large part by "knowing" the
consumer; and it limits the importance of traditional trademarks and brands. The next
Part considers this claim in greater detail.
IV. NASCENT Als

Various forms of artificial intelligence already influence consumer choices
online.129 We may be a long way off from the Al of the hypothetical, but trademark
law is already addressing a world of machine-guided purchasing.
In this, Amazon.corn provides a helpful illustration of many of the trademark
issues described above. As Amazon customers know, the website guides consumer
purchases by providing search suggestions that draw on a massive database of
product information as well as individual consumer data, reflected by past purchases
and browsing history. Amazon is also working hard to30make its Al technology a more
active participant in consumer purchasing decisions.'

judgment in favor of Amazon.com upon finding that "no reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to
shopping online would [] be confused as to the source of the products" in Amazon's search results).
129 See, e.g., Blake Morgan, How Amazon has Reorganized Around Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning,FORBES (July 16, 2018,2:37 PM), htlps'/www.forbes.com/sites/blakemorgan/2018/07/16/how-amazonhas-re-organizd-around-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-leaning/#252ad94d7361
[https'//permacc/M7WWPPTE] ("Al also plays a huge role in Amazon's recommendation engine, which generates 35% of the company's
revenue. Using data from individual customer preferences and purchases, browsing history and items that are related
and regularly bought together, Amazon can create a personalized list of products that customers actually want to
buy."). And there is no shortage of breathless predictions surrounding the purported benefits. See Paul Roetzer, his
AI Tool Gets Retail Customersto Buy More-andGet Smarter Over Time, MARKETING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
INST. (July 12, 2018), https-//www.maketingaiinstitote.conm/blog/his-ai-tool-gets-retail-customers-to-buy-moreand-get-smarter-over-time [https'/permacc/E8BB-EQ5J] (advertising a particular technology); see also The Future
of Artificial Intelligence in Consumer Experience: According to the AT&T Foundry, ROCKETSPACE,
https.:/www.rocketspace.com/hubfs/accelerator/the-future-of-articial-intelligence.pdf?hsLang---en-us
[https'//perma.c3S5C-MKXG] ("Due to a deep comprehension of the customer, brands will provide sublime
experiences catered to users' behavioral patterns. Everything from shopping to driving will draw from user behavior
to become highly pertinent and personalized to the end consumer. Intelligent prediction and optimization will allow
the consumer to feel that each branded product or experience is made just for them.").
130 As JeffBezos stated in his 2017 letter to shareholders:
At Amazon, we've been engaged in the practical application of machine learning for many
years now. Some of this work is highly visible: ... [including] Alexa, our cloud-based Al
assistant....
But much of what we do with machine learning happens beneath the surface. Machine learning
drives our algorithms for demand forecasting, product search ranking, product and deals
recommendations, merchandising placements, fraud detection, translations, and much more.
Though less visible, much of the impact of machine learning will be of this type - quietly but
meaningfully improving core operations.
Taylor Soper, Full Text. In Annual ShareholderLetter, JeffBezos Explains Why it will Never be Day 2 at Amazon,
GEEKWRE (Apr. 12, 2017, 8:22 AM), https.//www.geekwire.corr/2017/full-text-annual-letter-amazon-cco-jeffbezos-explains-avoid-becoming-day-2-company/ [htlps://pemaccUVV9-UKM6].
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3
Consumers naturally use the site to search for specific trademarked goods. '
But as discussed in the following subparts, Amazon.com also shows three ways that
the coming world may deemphasize trademarks and trademark law. First, the site
uses trademark information to generate alternative options to searched-for
products.'3 2 This practice has survived a legal challenge, reflecting the increasing
13 3
Second, the
judicial comfort with limiting trademark holder authority online.
134
For many, the Amazon
Amazon website limits the importance of trademarks.
platform matters more than the marks found on it. Those consumers who prefer the
Amazon ecosystem to shopping elsewhere appear to pay less attention to trademark
information than the traditional story of trademark law would suggest. Their actions
are more in line with the world of the hypothesized Al. Third, the platform presents
more than its share of problems as a model Al (particularly its lack of loyalty to its
customers), but these problems are not trademark problems. 3 '

A. Amazon and trademark'sonline retreat
As discussed in Part II, developments in AI may reduce the importance of
trademarks to ultimate purchasing decisions.' 36 Doctrinally, this would mean that
consumers (or their avatars) will be expected to assume a greater role in assessing
the context of third-party trademark uses, rather than letting trademark holders
control them.
Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.'3 7 takes a large step in this
direction. The watchmaker Multi Time Machine ("MTM") objected to
Amazon.com's use of its marks to arrange information for site users.' 3 8 Amazon does
not carry MTM watches.' 39 When Amazon received search queries for the "MTM
4
special ops" brand, it still returned a results list that included competing brands. '
41
Amazon did not simply advise the searcher of the brand's absence from Amazon.'
All of the search results were labeled accurately, but MTM nonetheless alleged
potential initial interest confusion. 4 2 The purported danger was that consumers
might speculate about a connection between the searched-for trademark and the

131 Amazon rivals Google with respect to use for product search. Krista Garcia, More Product
Searches Start on Amazon, EMARKETER (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.emarketer.com/content/moreproduct-searches-start-on-amazon [https://perma.cc/C9DQ-ZPXS] ("A number of consumer surveys have

shown that more US digital shoppers now start their searches on Amazon. Nearly half (46.7%) of US
internet users started product searches on Amazon compared with 34.6% who went to Google first,
according to a May 2018 Adeptmind survey.").
132 See infra Section IV.A.
133 See infra Section IV.A.
34
1 See infra Section IV.B.
13 See infra Section IV.C.
136
See supra Part II.
137 804 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2015).
3
8 d. at 932-33.
139Id. at 932.
'40 Id. at 932-33.
141 Id. at 936.
142 id.
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returned results.'43 The dissent treated the concern as plausible.' Nonetheless, the
majority imputed a higher level of sophistication on the part of Amazon.com users:
MTM argues that initial interest confusion might occur because Amazon
lists the search term used-here the trademarked phrase "mtm special
ops"-three times at the top of the search page. MTM argues that because
Amazon lists the search term "mtm special ops" at the top of the page, a
consumer might conclude that the products displayed are types of MTM
watches. But, merely looking at Amazon's search results page shows that
such consumer confusion is highly unlikely. None of these watches is
labeled with the word "MTM" or the phrase "Special Ops," let alone the
specific phrase "MTM Special Ops." . .. [N]o reasonably prudent

consumer accustomed to shopping online would view Amazon's search
results page and conclude that the products offered are MTM watches. It
is possible that someone, somewhere might be confused by the search
results page. But, "[u]nreasonable, imprudent and inexperienced web'
shoppers are not relevant."145
In the court's view, internet users are capable of reading information in context.
The majority trusted (and expected) consumers to understand that the returned results
meant "these are results similarto the watch brand you entered" and not "these are
results sponsoredby (or affiliated with) the watch brand you entered." In making this
assumption, the court allowed Amazon and its users to take advantage of the
information externalities of the MTM mark. These spillovers provided Amazon with
an efficient mechanism for communicating the existence of alternatives to MTM's
product.
But what of the "costs" of the activity? Even if there is no risk of source
confusion, given the accurate labeling of the search results, some consumers are
looking for a particular brand and only that brand. Isn't there a cost to making them
cut through the clutter to find the branded result? Here, the opinion accepts that
trademark law can only do so much. The nature of the internet means that there
always will be clutter that accompanies any search. Consumers would still face the
task of sorting results even if MTM had prevailed:
Further, some of the products listed are not even watches. The sixth result
14'
Id. at 933, 938. This purported danger finds some support in other cases. See, e.g., Maker's Mark
Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo North America, Inc., 679 F.3d 410,424 (6th Cir. 2012); Brookfield Commc'ns,
Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999); see also supra text accompanying
notes 39-46.
144Multi Time Mach., Inc., 804 F.3d at 940 (Bea, J.,
dissenting) ("Because I believe that an Amazon
shopper seeking an MTM watch might well initially think that the watches Amazon offers for sale when
he searches 'MTM Special Ops' are affiliated with MTM, I must dissent."). Indeed, Judge Bea initially
authored a majority opinion in MTM's favor, but it was superseded and replaced by the opinion discussed
in the text. Multi Time Mach., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 792 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2015), withdrawn and
supersededon reh'g, 804 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2015).
141Multi Time Mach., Inc., 804 F.3d at 938 (majority opinion) (quoting Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010)).
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is a book entitled "Survive!: The Disaster, Crisis and Emergency
Handbook by Jerry Ahem." The tenth result is a book entitled "The
Moses Expedition: A Novel by Juan G6mez-Jurado." No reasonably
prudent consumer, accustomed to shopping online or not, would assume
that a book entitled "The Moses Expedition" is a type of MTM watch or
is in any way affiliated with MTM watches.1 4 6
This is the filtration information model at work. All sorts of data are out there;
this clutter requires the use of search tools to sift and categorize information- Our
choices may or may not be compatible with the desires of trademark holders, but the
markholders cannot dictate them. In essence, the majority accepts that "mtm special
ops" is a term around which multiple communities of meaning may arise. Consumers
have both the freedom to sort the data surrounding the term and the obligation to
own the task. The trademark holder has no privileged authority beyond a very narrow
class of meanings (in this case, watches specifically branded MTM SPECIAL OPS).
Multi Time Machine's embrace of context echoes other cases. In Network
Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., the Ninth Circuit considered
the issue of trademark-triggered advertising, concluding that such advertising does
not create liability unless the displayed advertisement itself creates likely
confusion.1 4 7 Specifically, the court modified the use of the multifactor test in
keyword advertising cases:
[T]he most relevant factors to the analysis of the likelihood of confusion
are: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the evidence of actual confusion; (3)
the type of goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the
and
purchaser; and (4) the labeling and appearance of the advertisements
148
the surrounding context on the screen displaying the results page.
This fourth factor, absent from the traditional multifactor test, 149 effectively brings
false advertising thinking into the case.
The result echoes a point made above: False advertising doctrine is often a better
option than trademark law for addressing certain allegedly misleading activities
involving trademarks online.' 5 0 And, as did Multi Time Machine, the opinion accepts
that the online world requires consumers to sort through context without
automatically making assumptions based on the mere presence of a trademark. If
there is liability to be had by pairing information with a mark, there should be
something actionable about that information as reflected by advertising and other
"surrounding context."' 5 '
Domain names provide a final example of the liberalization of online use of
trademarks. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabariuses the nominative fair use

14
47

id.
See NetwodC Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 2011).

141 Id. at

1154.
1]53-54.
15oSee supra Section II.B.3.
"' See Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154.
1,9 See id. at
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doctrine to allow the unauthorized use of trademarks in third-party domain names. 15 2
The opinion sees consumers as knowing better than to attach too much importance
to the appearance of a trademark in a domain name when the URL contains other
information:
[Consumers] fully expect to find some sites that aren't what they imagine
based on a glance at the domain name or search engine summary. Outside
the special case of trademark.com, or domains that actively claim
affiliation with the trademark holder, consumers don't form any firm
expectations about the sponsorship of a website until they've seen the
landing page-if
then. This is sensible agnosticism, not consumer
1 53
confusion.
The opinion also appreciates the range of purposes that might surround the use of a
mark within a domain name:
But the case where the URL consists of nothing but a trademark followed
by a suffix like .com or org is a special one indeed. The importance

ascribed to trademark.com in fact suggests that far less confusion will
result when a domain making nominative use of a trademark includes
characters in addition to those making up the mark. Because the official
Lexus site is almost certain to be found at lexus.com (as, in fact, it is), it's
far less likely to be found at other sites containing the word Lexus. On the
other hand, a number of sites make nominative use of trademarks in their
domains but are not sponsored or endorsed by the trademark holder: You
can preen about your Mercedes at mercedesforum.com and
mercedestalk.net, read the latest about your double-skim-no-whip latte at
starbucksgossip.com and find out what goodies the world's greatest
electronics store has on sale this week at fryselectronics-ads.com.
Consumers who use the internet for shopping are generally quite
sophisticated about such matters and won't be fooled into thinking that
the prestigious
German car manufacturer sells boots at
mercedesboots.com, or homes at mercedeshomes.com, or that
comcastsucks.org is sponsored or endorsed by the TV cable company just
because 154
the string of letters making up its trademark appears in the
domain.
In other words, different online communities of meaning may grow up around
trademarks without harm to consumers.

B. One brandto rule them all?
As discussed above, the information-simplification offered by trademarks is a
double-edged sword. When consumers shop for favored brands that satisfy
152Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.
153Id. at 1179 (citation omitted).

154 Id. at 1178 (citations omitted).

v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175-77 (9th Cir. 2010).
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established preferences, they avoid a costlier search process that might lead them to
better results.' 55 The hypothesized Al offers a way out by doing the work of
The resulting marketplace
compiling the data that would identify better products.'556
7
would deemphasize trademarks in important respects.'
But today's second-best world shows another way As may deemphasize
trademarks. As illustrated by Multi Time Machine, many Amazon users engage in
another form of information simplification. By shopping at Amazon.com, they limit
their search to the Amazon ecosystem. That choice sets the range of available
trademarks. Rather than searching by selecting from among trademarks, many
Amazon users select Amazon, relying on its algorithms to narrow the range of
possibilities. To the extent particular brand names are not Amazon offerings, they
but they are
elsewhere,
available
excluded.' 5 8 They remain
are
pre-filtered from consideration. Stated another way, there is trademark work going
on, but it applies to platform competition (the selection of Amazon) and not
59
necessarily purchasing decisions beyond that (what is bought on Amazon).'
..5 See supra Section II.A.
136 See supra Sections I.B, II.A.
157 See supra Section II.A.
..8 Indeed, this selection effect is particularly strong for Amazon Prime users:
Amazon Prime users are both more likely to buy on its platform and less likely to shop
out a paid transaction on
elsewhere. "[Sixty-three percent] of Amazon Prime members carry
the site in the same visit," compared to 13% of non-Prime members. For Walmart and Target,
those figures are 5% and 2% respectively. One study found that less than 1% of Amazon Prime
members are likely to consider competitor retail sites in the same shopping session.
Lina M. Khan, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 752 (2017) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Clare O'Connor, Walmart and Target Being Crowded Out Online by Amazon Prime, FORBES (Apr. 6,
2015, 12:59 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/20l5/04/06/walmart-and-target-beingcrowded-out-online-by-amazon-prime [https://perma.cc/X6WC-6C7J]).
"' To be sure, this kind of information masking exists in traditional offline purchase decisions, as
when consumers choose to shop at a Wal-Mart or Target, and those choices allow consumers to offload
some amount of search costs to the retailer:
Retailers also reduce manufacturer-consumer transaction costs by satisfying the needs of
consumer niche markets more cheaply than manufacturers can. Determining consumer needs
is costly; it includes costs to aggregate data, analyze it, and respond to identified needs. For
manufacturers trying to cater to multiple, diverse, and far-flung consumer segments, it can be
cost-prohibitive to learn and understand the needs of every consumer niche, especially small
niches. In contrast, retailers can eater to consumer niches, such as specific geographies or
industries.
Goldman, supra note 50, at 413. But online retailers may have features-the ability to mine data at the
individual level, a greater breadth of possible offerings, and an ability to offer tailored nudges-that may
make online retailers different in kind:
Retailers often leverage their power and custody of the consumer to swap out brands for their
own private label. That's nothing new. Only we've never seen any retailer this good at it.
Amazon, armed with infinite capital provided by eager investors, is leading a war on brands to
starch themargin from brands and deliver it back to the consumer.
ScoTt GALLOWAY, THE FOUR: THE HIDDEN DNA OF AMAZON, APPLE, FACEBOOK, AND GOOGLE 51 -52 (2017);
cf Khan, supranote 158, at 782 (noting that while traditional retailer stores sometimes use house brands to compete
in vertical markets, such stores "are generally only able to collect information on actual sales, [while] Amazon tracks
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Amazon's power here is such that it has supplanted Google as the leading starting
point for product search,16 ° notwithstanding Google's comparative neutrality with
respect to product selection (as it is not involved with retail sales and fulfillment to
the extent that Amazon is). 16 '
The phenomenon of Amazon's increased use of its own and affiliated brands
suggests the vulnerability of trademarks to platform selection. Many Amazon.com
searches direct users to affiliated brands with little renown or goodwill outside of
Amazon. 1 62 The success of the practice may illustrate an antitrust issue, 63 but it also
highlights the ability of a consumer agent to negate the power of brands. In the case
of Amazon, it allows affiliated brands to develop what looks like near-instantaneous
goodwill. Indeed, Amazon's power is so strong that many of these upstart marks
break basic rules of brand attractiveness but nonetheless fmd their place in the
Amazon universe. For example:
A search for "three piece suit" on Amazon returns a litany of budget
brands like YFFUSHI, WULFUL and WEEN CHARM. Ungainly names
aside, some of these labels have been positively reviewed, overcoming the
considerable challenges of branding, and marketing, to an audience
thousands of miles away, and sometimes relying on the Amazon seller
marketplace and using the
company to handle fulfillment - warehousing
64
and shipping, basically.'
For this to happen, trademarks cannot be performing as much work as the traditional
trademark story would suggest. Traditional trademark uses (which brand of pants
should I buy on Amazon.com?) are simply less important in the Amazon-mediated
environment (which pants does Amazon suggest?).
It is entirely possible, of course, that in the near term, the net effect of online
technology is to raise, rather than lower, the importance of strong trademarks. If the
intemet makes available more marks in a product category than could ever be found
in a store, then looking to well-known marks is one way to manage the prospect of
information overload. 1 65 Sure. 166 But there is no reason to assume that consumers
what shoppers are searching for but cannot find, as well as which products they repeatedly return to, what they keep
in their shopping basket, and what their mouse hovers over on the screen").
16 Garcia, supra note 131.

161 Cf John Herrman, Everything on Amazon
is Amazon!, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/style/this-is-also-amazon.hbml [https//permaccfR5DL-PDAD].
162
See id. ("There are vanishingly few types of consumer goods that you can't buy, in some form, on
Amazon. But it is missing plenty of brands. In 2009, the company started selling products under its own
name. It soon moved beyond the first AmazonBasics-items including budget electronics and
batteries-to a wider range of Amazon-branded products. This was followed by an explosion of
company-owned brands, including dozens with Amazon-free names.").
163Khan, supra note 158, at 780-83.
'6'Herrman, supra note 161.
165 See Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load, 11 J.
MARKETING REs. 63, 68 (1974); see also Goldman, supra note 50, at 414-16.
166 But see supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing online retailers' ability to manage
information for consumers); infra note 168 and accompanying text.
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will forever be making the fmal decision themselves. Designating an agent to
compile a list of options is just a step along the way to trusting it to choose from
67
among the list or, as already happens, being open to its nudges.' And in any case,
evidence that brands occupy less of our mental space than they did
there is already
68
in the past. 1
C. Controllingavatars
This Article uses a conception of Al to examine trademark law, not vice versa.
That said, thinking of Amazon.com as an Al forerunner also illustrates some
potential dangers of offloading decisions to our digital assistants.
First, of course, the Amazon Al is a far cry from the thought experiment in terms
of capabilities. These limits may have trademark effects in simple ways. For
example, Amazon programming often recommends products based on past
purchases, 169 thus potentially exacerbating the problem of consumer inertia
(where future, better technology might ameliorate it). 7 °
Second, Amazon's business practices raise concerns regarding the competitive
marketplace. These exist with respect to its marketing and shipping infrastructure,
but also the data Amazon has about its customers, which gives Amazon a competitive
advantage.' 7' A similar issue exists with respect to whether consumer-focused Al
needs access to data about general consumer preferences in order to be effective in
considerations aside, privacy concerns
assisting particular consumers. Competitive
172
data.
such
compiling
complicate
may
Third, more powerful Als may be used to manipulate consumers into suboptimal
behavior, 1 73 be it purchasing second-best goods, engaging in needless transactions,
74
or simply continuing to generate valuable data for the creation of other products.
Likewise, the Al may systematically direct consumers to purchases selected to serve
someone else's needs. Rather than a bespoke world of goods and services tailored
precisely to individual consumer preferences, the marketplace may simply be one of
a few uber-brands using AI to serve their needs, manufacturing consumer
preferences as necessary. Aspects of that problem already confront us, as the
technologies that were touted as liberating or empowering individuals now
manipulate them on a scale (in terms of the number of people receiving individually
167 These nudges may be easier to implement when we order by voice rather than interacting with a
screen. GALLOWAY, supra note 159, at 51 ("In key categories like batteries, Alexa will suggest Amazon
Basics, their private label, and play dumb about other choices ('Sorry, that's all I found!') when there are
several other brands on amazon.com.").
168 Id. at 48 ("In 2004, 47 percent of affluent consumers could name a favorite retail brand; six years
later that number dropped to 28 percent."); id. at 50 (noting a declining "percentage of affluents who can
identify a 'favorite brand"' in the categories of fashion, jewelry, luxury hotels, and retailer).
169 Morgan, supra note 129.

170 See supra text accompanying notes 33 35.
171See Khan, supra note 158, at 782-83.
172
See generally ZUBOFF, supra note 18.
173 See, e.g., Calo,supra note 19, at 1021 ("[D]igital market manipulation combines, for the first time, a certain
kind ofpersonaizationwith the intense systemizafion made possible by mediated consumption.").
174 ZUBOFF, supra note 18, at 377, 451.

2019-2020

Al

AND THE "DEATH OF TRADEMARK"

calibrated nudges) never conceived of before the advent176of the internet. 7 5
Engineering machines to do so is itself an academic discipline.
This problem is not, however, one of trademark, but rather loyalty. 177 The
Amazon Al and those to follow in its footsteps are suspect because they serve
someone other than the consumers they purport to assist.178 The dilemma may not be
175 See, e.g., ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED: WAKING UP TO THE FACEBOOK CATASTROPHE 85 (2019)

('The artificial intelligences of companies like Facebook (and Google) now include behavioral prediction engines

that anticipate our thoughts and emotions, based on patterns found in the reservoir of data they have accumulated
about users. Years of Likes, posts, shares, comments, and Groups have taught Facebook's Al how to monopolize
our attention.'); O'NEIL, supra note 17, at 183-85 (describing experiments in how Facebook, Google, and other
search engines may manipulate users); Jon Brooks, Tech Insiders Call Out Facebookfor Literally Manipulating
Your Brain, KQED (May 25, 2017), htps://www.kqed.org/fteofyou/379828/tech-insiders-call-out-facebookfor-literally-manipulating-your-brain [httpsJ/penna.cc/LBJ6-DHWX]; Vindu Goel, Facebook Tinkers with Users'
Emotions in News Feed Eperimen, Stirring Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014),
https:/Avwwnytimes.con/2014/06/30/technology/facebook-tinkers-with-users-emnotions-in-news-feedexperiment-string-outcry.htnil [htps-J/penncc7T8X-CRE8]; Trevor Haynes, Dopanine,Smartaphones & You:
A Battlefor Your Thme, HARVARD U.: Sa. NEWS (May 1, 2018), http://sitJuns.harvardedu/flash/2018/dopaminesmartphones-battle-time/ [https://permacc/NL23-5BN3]; Hope Reese, Break Up with Your Smartphone,VOX (Feb.
9, 2018, 10:10 AM), https'//www.vox.com/conversations/2018/2/9/16994794/smartphone-tech-addiction
[h~tpsJ/permcc/MJD4-NFVV]; James Vincent, Former Facebook Exec Says Social Media is Ripping Apart
Society, VERGE (Dec. 11, 2017, 6:07 AM), httpsJ/www.theverge.com/2017/12/11/16761016/former-facebookexec-ripping-apart-society [https//prmacc/BJ2X-RB7H].
176BJ. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT WE THINK AND DO 5

(2003) ("[C]aptology focuses on the design, research andanaysis of interactive computingproducts createdfor
the purpose of changingpeople's attitudes or behaviors. It descibes the area where technology and persuasion
overlap." (citation omitted)). For an account of how these techniques may be used, see NIR EYAL WrrH RYAN
HOOVER, HOOKED: HOW TOBUID HABrr-FORMING PRODUCTS 179-80 (2014).
' Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciariesandthe FirstAmendment, 49 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1183,
1227 (2016) ("[O]nline service providers present the familiar problems that generally give rise to fiduciary
obligations. First, there are significant asymmetries of knowledge and information between online service
providers and end-users. Second, it is very difficult for end-users to verify online companies'
representations about data collection, security, use, and dissemination. Third, it is very difficult for
end-users to understand what online companies do with their data and how data analysis and use affects
their interests. Fourth, even if end-users understood these information practices, it would be almost
impossible for end-users to monitor them.").
17' As observed about the-now quaint-problems of targeted advertising, current technology is at
odds with the promise of AIs that would serve consumer needs:
The idealists foresaw a day when ad platforms would be like a loyal valet who detected his
master's needs before he was aware of them, who suggested a new pair of shoes as a reasonably
priced replacement for those you hadn't noticed were wearing out. Perhaps he would remind
you of your mother-in-law's birthday while offering to send an appropriate gift at a one-day
discount.
But the gap between this theory and its execution was wide enough to march Kitchener's Army
through it. Google's CEO Eric Schmidt had once said that the ideal was to "get right up to the
creepy line and not cross it." Unfortunately, by the mid-2010s, that line was being crossed

constantly. While promising to be "helpful" or "thoughtful," what was delivered was often
experienced as "intrusive" and worse. Some ads seemed more like stalkers than valets: if, say,
you'd been looking at a pair of shoes on Amazon, an ad for just those shoes would begin

following you around the web, prodding you to take another look at them.
TiM Wu, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR HEADS 323 (2016)
(footnotes omitted). Whether the tailored ads are hidden manipulation or seem more like overt harassment
may to some extent be a question of technical sophistication. As Wu observes, many ads:
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satisfied by competition, particularly if top-of-the-line Al proves to be the product
of a winner-take-all market or if the data necessary to make it effective is a byproduct
of a dominant share of some other market. Perhaps the issue can be addressed by
antitrust law, but it may be necessary to mandate a duty of loyalty for consumer
digital avatars. This issue would be, to say the least, complex as it reintroduces the
given the difficulty of
difficult question, ducked above, of what loyalty means
79
determining what consumer preferences actually are. '1
V. THE LARGER LIMITS OF TRADEMARK

Trademark law's inability to meet these challenges points the way to other
doctrines. Perhaps false advertising, antitrust, or consumer protection laws will fill
the necessary gaps. Perhaps entirely new doctrines and bodies of law will emerge to
fetter AI and promote consumer interests.
Whatever fills the gap, before long the law will have to squarely face the question
not only of what consumers want descriptively, but also-because the answer to this
question is a byproduct of consumer interactions with Al technology-what they
should want as a normative matter.
We already face the question in the much-bemoaned problem of online fake
news. Fake news illustrates a number of this Article's themes. First, it illustrates the
death of authority online. '8 0 There are no curators who might make these falsehoods
are cheaply created and waiting online for anyone to find
hard to find. Instead, they
181
and use as they see fit.
Second, fake news shows the limits of trademarks in the online world (and the
increasing importance of platforms18 2). We might have thought that trademark law
would be the natural solution to fake news. Given the high volume of falsehoods
the information market, limiting
online, reputable news sites should rise to the top of
83
the reach of false stories and conspiracy theories.'
...turned out to be more of a studied exploitation of one's weaknesses. The overweight were

presented with diet aids; the gadget-obsessed plied with the latest doodads; gamblers
encouraged to bet; and so on. One man, after receiving a diagnosis of pancreatic cancer, found
himself followed everywhere with "insensitive and tasteless" ads for funeral services. The
theoretical idea that customers might welcome or enjoy such solicitations increasingly seemed
like a bad joke.

Id.at 323-24.

179See supra note 21.

"0 See supra Part 1II.
11See, e.g., SANGER, supra note 84, at 185 (describing activities of Russian fake news operations
during the 2016 Presidential campaign, observing that for "a fraction of the cost for an evening of
television advertising on a local American television station.... Putin's trolls reached up to 126 million
Facebook users, while on Twitter they made 288 million impressions").
182See supra Part IV.
183Some sites do not mimic any particular page, but rather strive simply to look like a news outlet, and that
is enough in many cases. See Abby Ohlheiser, This is how Facebook'sFake-news Writers Make Money, WASH.
POST (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpostcom/news/the-intersec/wl/2016/11/18/this-is-how-theintemets-fake-news-writers-make-moneyi?utmterm-.bda32a90ed2a [https://permacc/WG82-NFEW]. It is
likewise easy to create the appearance of advocacy group activities. For example, during the 2016 campaign, the
Internet Research Agency, a Russian organization operating in St. Petersburg, organized a "Stop Islamization of

2019-2020

Al

AND THE "DEATH OF TRADEMARK"

But trademarks have simply proven to be unequal to the task. Part of the problem
is the role of platforms. Sites like Facebook deliver algorithmically selected content,
84
allowing many users to suture themselves into the filter bubble of their choosing,'
assuming they can be said to be choosing to do so. 185 These sites thus far have little
market or regulatory pressure to address the negative externalities of fake news
consumption.186 Moreover, channeling users into simple, extreme categories defined
by Left and Right-rather than serving information that would reinforce more
moderate tendencies-seems the path of least resistance with current algorithmic
87
technology.'

Worse, in many cases the problem is not that trademarks are not functioning, but
rather that they are. In a world in which the president derides unfriendly press as
fake, the avoidance of reputable news sites becomes just another form of political
expression.' 8 8 Many fake news consumers are getting exactly what they want. The
law isn't the problem so much as the citizens it would protect.
That answer carries a tragic dimension for which there may not be law-based
answers. In 2018 the Washington Post profiled a fake news creator who posts the

Texas" event sponsored by the made-up "Heart of Texas" group. SANGER, supra note 84, at 201-02. "Then, in
a masterful stroke, the Russians created an opposing group, 'United Muslims of America,' which scheduled a
counter-rally, under the banner of'Save Islamic Knowledge.' The idea was to motivate actual Americans-who
had joined each of the Facebook groups--to face off against each other and prompt a lot of name-calling and,
perhaps, some violence." Id.
at 202.
' There has long been a debate about whether the net effect of the internet is to inform or fence
people off into the echo chamber of their choosing. See, e.g., WEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 81-83. Both
may be possible. Hunt Allcott et al., The Welfare Effects of Social Media 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 25514, 2019), http://web.stanford.edu/-gentzkow/research/facebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BM6R-35TC] (study reporting that Facebook deactivation "reduced both factual news
knowledge and political polarization" but "increased subjective well-being").
"' See MCNAMEE, supra note 175, at 92-93 (describing how platforms facilitate extreme views); cf.
O'NEIL, supra note 17, at 194 ("Successful microtargeting, in part, explains why in 2015 more than 43
percent of Republicans, according to a survey, still believed the lie that President Obama is a Muslim.").
186See, e.g., SANGER, supra note 84, at 253-55; see also GALLOWAY, supra note 159, at 118 ("[f]f
[Facebook] figures out you lean Republican, it will feed you more Republican stuff, until you're ready
for the heavy hitters, the GOP outrage: Breitbart, talk radio clips. You may even get to Alex Jones.").
187See GALLOWAY, supra note 159, at 117-19; id.at 118 ("Marketing to moderates is like fracking
for gas. You only do it if the easier alternatives aren't available.").
...
This is not to say that trademarks are never counterfeited to spread fake news. See, e.g., Ian Stewart,
Real Fake News: Activists CirculateCounterfeit Editions of 'The Washington Post,' NPR (Jan. 16, 2019,
1:23 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/16/685857177/real-fake-news-activists-circulate-counterfeiteditions-of-the-washington-post [https://perma.cc/PT56-M2KL]. But while trademark law can address the
problem of sites designed to pass themselves off as a specific reputable source, see Joshua Humphrey, The
Plague of Fake News and the Intersection with Trademark Law, 8 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 126,
146 (2017) (contending that "trademark infringement can be a successful strategy in combating fake news
if likelihood of confusion can be proved"), it has a harder time with those that merely try to look as though
they are reputable. Trademark doctrine therefore struggles with activities that create noise that might mask
the signal sent by marks that certify quality. See Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2311, 2332, 2343-44 (2009); Grynberg, supra note 113, at 1457; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018)
(providing that a mark can serve as a trademark "even if th[e] source is unknown").

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 108

89
most outlandish stories possible as a form of political commentary.' His goal is to
call attention to the propensity of some on the right wing to believe anything sure enough:

In the last two years on his page, America's Last Line of Defense, Blair
had made up stories about California instituting sharia, former president
Bill Clinton becoming a serial killer, undocumented immigrants defacing
Mount Rushmore, and former president Barack Obama dodging the
Vietnam draft when he was 9. "Share if you're outraged!" his posts often
read, and thousands of people on Facebook had clicked "like" and then
"share," most of whom did not recognize his posts as satire. Instead,
Blair's page had become one of the most popular on Facebook among
Trump-supporting conservatives over 55.
"Nothing on this page is real," read one of the 14 disclaimers on Blair's
site, and yet in the America of 2018 his stories had become real,
reinforcing people's biases, spreading onto Macedonian and Russian fake
news sites, amassing an audience of as many 6 million visitors each month
who thought his posts were factual. What Blair had first conceived of as
an elaborate joke was beginning to reveal something darker. "No matter
how racist, how bigoted, how offensive, how obviously fake we get,
people keep coming back," Blair once wrote, on his own personal
Facebook page. "Where is the edge? Is there ever a point where people
realize they're being fed garbage and decide to return to reality?""'9
The story goes on, however, to profile one such believer, and a sadder picture
emerges, one less of political activism and more of loneliness and social isolation:
The house was empty and quiet except for the clicking of her computer
mouse. She lived alone, and on many days her only personal interaction
occurred here, on Facebook. Mixed into her morning news feed were
photos and updates from some of her 300 friends, but most items came
directly from political groups [she] had chosen to follow: "Free Speech
Patriots," "Taking Back America," "Ban Islam," "Trump 2020" and
"Rebel Life." Each political page published several posts each day
directly into [her] feed, many of which claimed to be "BREAKING
NEWS."
On display above [her] screen were needlepoints that had once occupied
much of her free time, intricate pieces of artwork that took hundreds of
hours to complete, but now she didn't have the patience. Out her window
was a dead-end road of identical beige-and-brown rock gardens
surrounding double-wide trailers that looked similar to her own, many of
them occupied by neighbors whom she'd never met. Beyond that was
nothing but cactuses and heat waves for as far as she could see - a stretch
189Eli Saslow, 'Nothing on this Page is Real': How Lies Become Truth in Online America, WASH.
POST (Nov. 17, 2018, 7:40 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/nothing-on-this-page-is-realhow-lies-become-truth-in-online-america/2018/11/17/edd44cc8-e85a- I1e8-bbdb-

72fdbf9d4fed story.html?noredirect=on&utm termi=.97e60caefccl [https://perna.cc/RZG8-EAJB].
190Id.
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of unincorporated land that continued from her backyard into the desert.
She'd spent almost a decade in Pahrump[' 91] without really knowing why.
The heat could be unbearable. She had no family in Nevada. She loved
going to movies, and the town of 30,000 didn't have a theater. It seemed
to her like a place in the business of luring people - into the airconditioned casinos downtown, into the legal brothels on the edge of the
desert, into the new developments of cheap housing available for no
money down - and in some ways she'd become stuck, too.

[She] didn't believe everything she read online, but she was also
distrustful of mainstream fact-checkers and reported news. It sometimes
felt to her like real facts had become indiscernible - that the truth was
often somewhere in between. What she trusted most was her own ability
to think critically and discern the truth, and increasingly her instincts
aligned with the online community where she spent most of her time. It
had been months since she'd gone to a movie. It had been almost a year
since she'd made the hour-long trip to Las Vegas. Her number of likes
and shares on Facebook increased each year until she was sometimes
awakening to check her news feed in the middle of the night, liking and
commenting on dozens of posts each day. She felt as if she was being let
the United States, and it was her
in on a series of dark revelations about192
responsibility to see and to share them.
The underlying problems suggested by this passage are so complex as to seem
intractable (in addition to being unrelated to the information problems of fake news).
And in any case, on some level, this consumer of fake news is getting what she wants.
But should she? And how much is this due to the engineering of the Facebook
policy-making and what is
experience? 93 Deeply contested questions of paternalist
194
normatively best for people follow closely behind.
While the fake news debate is particularly charged, similar issues arise with more
mundane consumer issues. Perhaps Als will tend, for example, to make
recommendations that rest on past consumer experience at the expense of novelty,

is in Nevada, about an hour west of Las Vegas.
supra note 189.

191Pahrump
192 Saslow,

193See, e.g., MCNAMEF, supra note 175, at 166 (describing how changes to Facebook's News Feed to favor
algorithmic over human moderation "had the effect of promoting the primary elements of filter bubbles-family,
friends, and Groups-at the expense of the content most likely to pierce a filter bubble, journalism").
19'
To the extent these issues are resolvable, there remains the question whether the state can meaningfiully
regulate in this area given the First Amendment. Soe, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep)
FakeNews, 71 OKLA. L. REv. 59, 116 (2018) ('The question raised by deep fakes and similar technology, then, is
whether First Amendment law can leave government with room to protect the social foundations that allow
individuals to serve as their own 'watchmen for truth' without simultaneously inviting officials to control and restrict
how they play that role.").
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reflecting consumer inertia (in other words, consumers at the margin may, as a
descriptive matter, prefer familiarity to change even when the change would be an
improvement). What then?
Maybe the law will still want to drive consumers to consider new things in order
to promote innovation and competition. Doing so would move the law in the
direction of regulating consumer behavior. Resolving the issue would require
development of a theory to explain when non-incumbent competitors should get a
shot before the consumer.
Perhaps these issues should be addressed at a higher level of generality. Maybe
the argument will be that if in the world to come As will have the power to guide us
in a non-reflective state, then the law must require that people have more than one
voice in their ears. Whatever our ability to find the appropriate vocabulary to debate
these questions, we won't locate it in trademark law.
CONCLUSION

To some extent, trademark law is about authority. Who gets to define a mark and
how? What kinds of uses may a markholder control? Some of these questions are
easy. The owner of the COCA-COLA mark gets to determine what kind of soda
bears the brand. One cannot redefine the mark by counterfeiting it. But one is free to
comment on the trademarked product in ways that may affect mark meaning
(e.g., "High-sugar products like COCA-COLA are a menace to public health").
Other issues are harder, and trademark law must constantly mediate between the
claims of markholders and third parties making novel uses of trademark meanings.
Many recent battles concerned the internet, and future technological developments
will naturally continue to test trademark law. Imagining a hypothetical technological
endpoint for digital assistants suggests ways that innovation may upset the place of
trademark law in the consumer information ecosystem as we know it today. On the
one hand, trademarks may lose importance as it becomes easier to turn purchasing
decisions over to digital assistants or similar tools that look beyond the
comparatively simple signals embodied in brand names. At the same time, digital
technology is making it easier for different groups to attach different meanings to
trademarks without experiencing the harms associated with trademark infringement.
These changes open the door to a more pluralist vision of trademark meaning,
one that shifts the balance of power between trademark holders and the rest of us.
Though that vision was not shared by the courts in the first wave of cases involving
online trademarks, more recent precedent shows a greater receptivity.
But they also point to deeper issues regarding information in the digital era.
Whatever the ultimate equilibrium between pluralist and authoritarian visions of
trademark law, neither perspective has much to say to these challenges even though
they might appear to touch on trademark law's domain. The thought experiment of
this Article therefore supports those who see a larger gap in our laws that society has
to decide whether and how to fill.

